How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Cross-Section of Countries by Adi Brender & Allan Drazen
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
HOW DO BUDGET DEFICITS AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH AFFECT REELECTION PROSPECTS?









We wish to thank Mark Duggan for useful comments and Amir Marchak, Lior Gallo and Sagie Dagan for
superb research assistance. Drazen wishes to thank the Israel Science Foundation, the National Science
Foundation, grant 418412, and the Yael Chair in Comparative Economics, Tel Aviv University for financial
support, as well as the Research Department of the Bank of Israel for its hospitality. The views expressed
in the paper do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Israel.  The views expressed herein are those of
the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2005 by Adi Brender and Allan Drazen.    All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source.How Do Budget Defecits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a
Large Cross-Section of Countries
Adi Brender and Allan Drazen
NBER Working Paper No. 11862
December 2005
JEL No. D72, E62, H62
ABSTRACT
Conventional  wisdom  is  that  good  economic  conditions  or  expansionary  fiscal  policy  help
incumbents get re-elected, but this has not been tested in a large cross-section of countries. We test
these arguments in a sample of 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. We find no evidence that
deficits help reelection in any group of countries  ￿developed and less developed, new and old
democracies, countries with different government or electoral systems, and countries with different
levels of democracy. In developed countries, especially old democracies, election-year deficits
actually reduce the probability that a leader is reelected, with similar negative electoral effects of
deficits in the earlier years of an incumbent's term in office. Higher growth rates of real GDP per-
capita raise the probability of reelection only in the less developed countries and in new democracies,
but voters are affected by growth over the leader's term in office rather than in the election year itself.
Low inflation is rewarded by voters only in the developed countries. The effects we find are not only
statistically significant, but also quite substantial quantitatively. We also suggest how the absence
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Manipulation of economic policy in election years has been widely studied. Following 
Nordhaus’s (1975) influential model of how expansionary policy before an election can help 
incumbents to get reelected, there has been a search for empirical evidence linking economic 
policy and economic performance before elections to the votes that an incumbent receives.  
Most research on pre-electoral manipulation did not however examine directly whether 
expansionary policies or good economic outcomes succeed in attracting votes. Instead, the focus 
has been on the existence of political business cycles (increases in economic activity in election 
years relative to non-election years) or political budget cycles (election-year increases in deficits 
or expenditures or cuts in taxes). The evidence for the former in developed countries is not 
strong.  Alt and Chrystal (1983) summarize early empirical studies for the United States as 
showing a little evidence of a political business cycle, a point reinforced by results summarized in 
Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997). Faust and Irons (1999) come to a similar conclusion.   
Similarly, there is no strong evidence of a significant political business cycle in unemployment or 
economic growth in other developed economies (Paldam [1979], Lewis-Beck [1988], Alesina, 
Roubini, and Cohen [1997]).   
There is also a literature examining the effects of economic growth on the probability of 
reelection directly, mostly in developed countries. Generally, the effect of growth on reelection 
was found to be insignificant in most cross-section studies in developed countries (Powell and 
Whitten (1993), Paldam (1991), Strøm and Lipset (1984) and Lewis-Beck (1988)). The U.S. 
seems to be an exception to these findings, where Fair (1978) found a significant effect of growth 
on voting in presidential elections, as did Alesina and Rosenthal (1995). No similar analysis was 
done for less developed countries.  
The lack of convincing evidence for a political business cycle led researchers to focus on 
political cycles in economic policy. Though Nordhaus considered expansionary monetary policy 
(inducing a movement along the Phillips curve), current research focuses on the effect of 
expansionary fiscal policy, especially higher deficits, on an incumbent’s reelection prospects. 
Many empirical studies find evidence of a political budget cycle, with the common view that 
political budget cycles are a phenomenon more of less-developed countries than of developed 
ones.
1   
                                                      
1 For a summary see Drazen (2001) or Brender and Drazen (2005a). 
   2Two recent studies find evidence that the political budget cycle is present in both 
developed and less-developed countries.  Shi and Svensson (2002) in a panel data set of 91 
countries over 1975-95, both democracies and non-democracies, find that, in an election year, the 
government surplus falls significantly in both less-developed and developed countries (though the 
effect is far stronger in less-developed countries). Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 8) argue 
that there is a strong political budget cycle in both developed and less-developed democracies 
over the period from 1960 to 1998.  They find a political revenue cycle (government revenues as 
a percent of GDP decrease before elections), but no political cycle in expenditures, transfers, or 
the overall budget balance.  
In contrast, Brender and Drazen (2005a) argue that political budget cycles found in such 
large cross-section studies are driven by the experience of “new democracies”, that is, by the 
experience of newly democratic countries in up to the first four elections after the transition to 
democracy.  It is the strong fiscal cycle in these countries that accounts for the finding of a fiscal 
cycle in larger samples including these countries, which disappears once the new democracies are 
removed from the larger sample. The political budget cycle in new democracies accounts for any 
significant cycle in both developed and less developed economies; for the finding that the cycle is 
stronger in weaker democracies; and for differences in the political cycle across government or 
electoral systems.  
In contrast to the fairly extensive direct tests of overall macroeconomic performance on 
election outcomes, there are few tests of fiscal performance on election outcomes, and none on 
the national level of which we are aware.
2 Peltzman (1992), Brender (2003), and Drazen and 
Eslava (2005a) examine the direct effect of fiscal performance on reelection at the state and local 
level in a single country (the United States, Israel, and Colombia respectively), and find that 
voters punish – rather than reward – loose fiscal policies in general, as well as in election years.  
None of these country studies examines directly whether fiscal expansions during election years 
at the national level help incumbents to get reelected. Moreover, any empirical conclusions one 
might draw should, strictly speaking, be limited to these countries, rather than applicable to a 
broad cross-section of countries analogous to the studies of the political budget cycle itself.  
To summarize, existing studies do not provide a direct answer to the question whether 
                                                      
2   Alesina, Perotti and Tavares (1998) analyze the effects of fiscal adjustments in a cross section of 
OECD countries, but focus on cabinet changes, rather than on election results. 
   3election year deficits are a useful instrument for gaining reelection in those countries for which a 
political deficit cycle has been found, nor in the broader cross-section of countries for which 
political budget cycles have been studied. That is, the key question which forms the basis of large 
cross-country studies of the political budget cycle has not been tested on a data set covering the 
same countries!  
In the current study we look directly at the effects of fiscal performance and growth on 
reelection in various groups of countries. Using information on 350 election campaigns in 74 
democracies we examine whether: 1) increased deficits during an election year raise the 
probability of reelection; 2) loose fiscal policies during the term in office help reelection; 3) GDP 
growth during the term in office, and specifically in the election year, helps incumbents to get 
reelected; and, 4) these forces work differently in countries at different levels of economic 
development, strength of democracy, or with different electoral or government systems. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In the next section we summarize some of the 
conceptual arguments on how fiscal or economic performance may affect voting behavior. In 
section 3, we describe the dataset and variable definitions. Section 4 sets out the basic empirical 
results on the effect of deficits and growth on the probability of a leader’s reelection. We find no 
evidence that larger deficits during an election year or over the term increase the probability of 
reelection, with rising deficits having a clear negative effect in developed and old democracies. 
Economic growth over the leader's term has a positive effect on the probability of reelection only 
in less developed countries and new democracies. In section 5 we examine the robustness of these 
findings to various different specifications.  In section 6 we consider differences in the effects of 
deficits and growth on reelection in old and new democracies, while in section 7 we investigate 
the importance of different government or electoral systems, or the level of democracy for these 
effects. The lack of support for the electoral value of deficit spending characterizes all these 
different country groupings. In section 8, we consider some alternative explanations of our 
results, as well as addressing the question of why expansionary fiscal policy doesn’t appear to 
gain votes for the incumbent even in new democracies where our earlier work found a clear 
political budget cycle. Section 9 contains conclusions.  
 
2. Performance and Reelection 
In this section we review both the conceptual arguments on why election-year expansions 
in general or fiscal expansions in particular might help an incumbent's reelection prospects, as 
   4well as some of the arguments why in fact we may not observe such effects and may even 
observe punishment for election-year deficits. 
 
A. Economic growth and reelection 
There are a number of basic, intuitive arguments on why growth could help reelection. 
Most obviously, since economic policies affect economic performance, it would not be surprising 
that good macroeconomic results would be taken as indicating that a leader has good skills to run 
the country.  
This may reflect simple retrospective voting rules. As Nordhaus (1989, p. 39) puts it: 
 
In light of their rudimentary understanding of the intricacies of legal, political, and economic 
structures, voters might be generally unable to distinguish policy shocks from external shocks 
and simply hold the incumbent government responsible for whatever events transpired. In short, 
… retrospective evaluation of the performance of incumbents on the bases of simple and easily 
understood indexes (such as unemployment, GNP growth, or inflation) might be a reasonable 
way for many voters to make political decisions.  
 
The use of such retrospective voting rules by rational, forward-looking voters could be motivated 
by assuming that good performance may be a sign of competence, which is valued by voters but 
cannot be directly observed, as for example, in Persson and Tabellini (1990).  (Rogoff [1990] and 
Rogoff and Sibert [1989] were the first to formalize this for fiscal policy, as discussed below.
3  
On the other hand, voters may perceive that in a global economy governments may matter 
only a little for certain types of economic performance, including sustained economic growth. 
Their voting behavior might then be relatively unaffected by some measures of good economic 
performance, especially in small open economies. (The significant effect of economic growth on 
election results found for the United States may be due in part to its being a dominant and 
relatively closed economy.) A growth spurt in the election year itself might be especially 
suspicious and hence would be less likely to affect voters.  
Which of the general views set out in the previous two paragraphs better describes voters 
in a given country may depend on its characteristics, specifically the newness of the democracy 
and whether it is a developed or less developed economy. The first distinction follows our results 
discussed above on the presence of a fiscal cycle in new democracies versus its absence in 
                                                      
3   Another argument is simply that high GDP implies higher government revenues and thus improved 
government services. To the extent that voters tie these improvements to the current incumbent, his re-
election chances may be improved.
   5established democracies. Based on this difference, it would not be surprising if voting patterns 
responded in fact to economic outcomes more in new than in old democracies.  A further piece of 
evidence suggesting different voter response is based on responses reported in the World Values 
Survey (Inglehart et al. [2004]). In new democracies used in our study that were covered by the 
World Values Survey, respondents care more about good economic performance than in old 
democracies.  A statistically significant larger fraction of respondents in new democracies 
responded that a high level of economic growth or (separately) a stable economy is the most 
important target for their country among several policy targets. This effect is significant even 
when one controls for the level of income and the demographic structure of the country. The 
same analysis also showed a statistically significant negative correlation between the proportion 
of respondents who thought that these two targets were the most important and the level of GDP 
per-capita in a country.
4 Hence, the empirical question arises as to whether the effect of economic 
growth on voter behavior is in fact different in new versus old democracies and in developed 
versus less developed countries, questions that we address here. 
The possible difference in voter response to economic growth in developed versus less 
developed countries is suggested by the difference in the existence of a political business cycle in 
the two types of economies – that is, the clear absence of a cycle in developed economies versus 
the seeming less clear rejection in less developed economies. Here too, there is no empirical study 
of a large cross-section of developed and less developed countries that addresses whether there is 
a difference in the effect of economic growth on an incumbent’s reelection chances. We address 
this question as well. 
 
B. Deficits and reelection:  
Analogous to our discussion in the previous subsection, we begin by reviewing the 
arguments on why an incumbent’s reelection chances may be helped (or harmed) by 
expansionary fiscal policy in general, and in election years in particular. We begin with the 
arguments of why fiscal expansions and deficit spending may help incumbents gain votes so that 
politicians may be expected to engage in it and that empirically it is widespread.  Such a view 
underlies much of the literature on the political budget cycle.  
The simplest argument follows from the argument above that good economic performance 
                                                      
4   For more details see Brender and Drazen (2005b). 
   6helps an incumbent’s reelection chances. To the extent that expansionary fiscal policy can be 
successfully used to manipulate macroeconomic outcomes and provide higher growth, which in 
turn, it is argued, gains votes for the incumbent, loose fiscal policy will help an incumbent’s 
reelection prospects. As already noted, there is also theoretical work, such as Rogoff (1990), 
arguing how fiscal expansions during election years could lead rational voters to vote for 
incumbents who produce them because it signals high competence when there is uncertainty 
about the incumbent's ability.  
Another argument concerns the effectiveness of “pork barrel” spending – that is, spending 
targeted to specific groups – in gaining votes for the incumbent. There is a large literature 
investigating the use of such spending projects to gain votes, (as well as a large folk wisdom 
about its extensive use), though much of it not in the context of political budget cycles per se.  
A third, general sort of argument on the effectiveness of fiscal policy in gaining votes is 
that voters simply prefer low taxes and high spending and reward politicians who deliver these. 
Of course, there is the question of why such voters would “ignore” the government’s 
intertemporal budget constraint in rewarding deficit-producing politicians. One set of responses 
focus on various sorts of fiscal illusion. The Rogoff argument mentioned above relies on 
imperfectly informed, rational voters, who observe higher expenditures (or lower taxes) but 
believe that more competent policymakers can provide these without necessarily incurring higher 
deficits.
5  More generally, the type of Nordhaus (1989) argument set out above on voter response 
to good economic performance might justify similar response to low taxes or high expenditure.   
As with the effect of good economic performance, there are a number of reasons to 
believe that loose fiscal policy need not help an incumbent’s reelection chances and may actually 
harm them. Rational voters may well be “fiscal conservatives” who punish rather than reward 
deficit spending and fiscal manipulation, even more so if it is perceived as electorally motivated. 
The competence models of Rogoff and others rely on imperfect information about fiscal policy; 
were information perfect, rational voters would not be swayed by electoral manipulation. 
Peltzman (1992), for example, shows that voters in the U.S. are less likely to support a state or 
local official who has increased overall spending before the election. 
                                                      
5 A key innovation of Shi and Svensson (2002) is that the policymaker chooses fiscal policy before he 
knows his competence level, so that all “types” choose the same level of expansion.  An implication is an 
aggregate deficit cycle. 
   7Furthermore, even if good economic conditions help an incumbent’s chances of 
reelection, it is not clear that fiscal manipulation will be effective. Though a “strong economy” 
may help incumbents’ re-election prospects, politicians may have very limited ability to 
successfully manipulate the economy to help their re-election chances.  In addition to a 
policymaker’s lack of technical ability to time the expansion accurately enough to happen just 
before the elections, it is argued that manipulating economic activity is considered harmful in 
terms of “unsmoothing” consumption, inducing investment cycles, etc.  Here too, rational, well-
informed voters should not support such policies, so that pre-electoral manipulation would be 
punished rather than rewarded at the polls. Similarly, targeted spending may lose votes if it is 
perceived as electoral manipulation.
6   
To summarize, as in the case of the effects of economic growth on an incumbent's 
reelection, there are conceptual arguments on both sides. We believe that there are good 
arguments why fiscal manipulation will not work in most countries, while the arguments why it 
might work are reasonable only in some groups of countries. As with economic conditions and 
voting patterns, there is no empirical work testing the connection between aggregate fiscal 
policies and an incumbent's budget deficits for a large cross-section of countries.  The absence of 
political budget cycles in fiscal aggregates in all countries other than new democracies gives 
reason to doubt whether deficit spending has significant effects on voting patterns in established 
democracies, even though this is the implicit assumption of papers that find such a cycle. Hence, 
there is a need to confront the different views with the data.  
 
3. Data and Variable Definitions 
The dataset used in this study is based on information from several sources (see Table A-
1). Fiscal data are taken mostly from the IFS, national accounts data from the World Bank's 
World Development Indicators and the IFS, information on the political structure of countries, 
their electoral system and additional political variables is constructed using the World Bank's 
database of Political Institutions (DPI) and data on the level of democracy are taken from the 
Polity IV dataset at the University of Maryland. A detailed description of the data sources and the 
construction of the variables appears in Appendix I. The combination of sources allows us to use 
                                                      
6   Drazen and Eslava (2005b), however, present a model of political cycles in pork barrel spending in 
which an expenditure cycle may exists even if a targeted group of voters know it is being targeted. 
   8data for 74 countries over the period 1960-2003. Overall we have useable information on 347 
election campaigns that took place in periods where these countries were democratic. The 
countries and election campaigns are listed in Tables A-2 and A-3, respectively. 
The key political variable REELECT is a binary variable with a value of 1 if the 
incumbent was reelected and 0 if he or she was not. Its construction was based on information 
from the "World Political Leaders 1945-2005" database of Zárate's Political Collections (ZPC) 
and from the "World Statesmen" encyclopedia. These data allowed us to follow the terms of 
individual leaders in office from appointment to termination, and to associate them with election 
dates. The decision whether the prime minister or the president is the leader is based on the DPI 
dataset classification, as described in Persson and Tabellini (2003). Information on election dates 
and results (presidential elections in presidential systems and parliamentary elections in 
parliamentary ones) is taken from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance (IDEA) dataset "Voter Turnout Since 1945", from the International Foundation for 
Election Systems ELECTION GUIDE dataset and is supplemented by Binghamton University's 
Election Results archive. 
We use two definitions of REELECT throughout the analysis. In the narrow definition 
we include only observations where the leader is running for reelection herself (either as the 
leader of her party in parliamentary elections or personally in presidential ones). We constrain the 
sample to observations of leaders who were in office for at least two fiscal years prior to the 
elections and were candidates in the elections or retired within the month before the elections (in 
which case we classify the leader as losing reelection). In the expanded definition we add cases 
in which a leader was substituted by another candidate from his party under the following specific 
circumstances: 1) the leader died in the year before the elections; 2) the leader could not run for 
reelection due to legal term limits. In these cases the substitute leader (in the first case) or the 
candidate from the leader's party (in the second case) is treated as the incumbent. Additionally, in 
the expanded sample, we treat leaders who quit their job within a year before the elections as 
having lost reelection (that is, the binary variable REELECT has a value of 0), while in the 
narrow sample it is defined as a missing value as long as the leader quits more than a month 
before the elections. This latter classification is in line with the methodology of Alesina, Perotti, 
and Tavares (1998) and Brender (2003). 
In Table 1 we show the distribution of election campaigns according to the two 
definitions. There are 255 campaigns in the narrow sample which are evenly split between 
   9successful and unsuccessful reelection attempts. About two thirds of the observations are in 
developed countries (23 OECD countries, see Table A-2) and the probability of reelection among 
them is somewhat higher than in the undeveloped countries. A breakdown of the sample between 
established and new democracies reveals that three quarters of the sample come from established 
democracies. The use of the expanded definition adds 92 observations to the data, mostly 
undeveloped countries. It also increases substantially the number of elections in new 
democracies. However, the change in definitions also increases substantially the proportion of 
campaigns where the incumbent (or his substitute) are not reelected. This is a reflection of both 
the lower success rates of substitute candidates, and the inclusion of those observations where the 
candidate has quit his job within the year before the elections.  
The use of the narrow sample has the advantage of focusing only on the cases where the 
same person who led the government before the elections is the one seeking reelection. The 
homogeneity of this sample may reflect a clearer relationship between performance and 
reelection and avoids questions of the extent to which voters associate the new candidate with the 
policies of his predecessor. On the other hand, using the narrow definition means a substantial 
loss of information. We therefore present in the remainder of this paper results using both 
samples. 
We examine fiscal performance using two variables BALCH_term and BALCH_ey. The 
first variable reflects the change in the central government's balance (that is, budget surplus) to 
GDP ratio over the term in office by comparing the average balance/GDP ratio in the two years 
before the election year with that in the previous two years. The second variable is the change in 
the balance/GDP ratio in the election year relative to the previous year, which is an indicator for 
election year fiscal expansions. Both variables are calculated on the basis of IFS data, 
supplemented with GFS data, as described in Brender and Drazen (2005a). All our data are 
adjusted to fiscal years. (In 12 of the countries the fiscal year does not overlap the calendar year.) 
While in some cases it is not clear which fiscal year should correspond to the election year, 
especially when the elections take place in the early part of the year, Brender and Drazen (2005a) 
and others (for example, Alesina, Perotti and Tavares [1998]) find that the relationship between 
fiscal policy and the timing of elections is not very sensitive to the definition used. Nevertheless, 
we also present below some sensitivity indicators to show that our results are not qualitatively 
affected by the definition. 
   10Our indicator for macroeconomic performance is GDPPC_gr, which is the average annual 
growth rate of real GDP per capita between the current and the previous election year. In cases 
where the leader assumed power after the previous elections, we calculate GDPPC_gr only over 
the period since his appointment. We also include, separately, in some of our equations, the real 
growth rate of GDP in the election year. Finally, we calculated the deviation of GDP from its 
long term trend (using a country-specific Hodrick-Prescott filter) for each country in each year, 
and used this variable in some of our equations as a control for the business cycle. 
 
4. The Effect of Deficits and Growth on Reelection 
We begin with the basic results. In Table 2 we examine the effect of deficits and growth 
on the probability of reelection using Probit estimation.
7 In columns 1 and 4 we show the 
unconditional effects in the narrow and expanded samples, respectively. The equations show that 
voters are likely to punish persistent budget deficits over the term in office (a negative value of 
BALCH_term implies a loss of votes) rather than reward leaders who create them. The 
coefficient of the change in the deficit to GDP ratio over the term in office, excluding the election 
year, is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the probability of reelection is 
increasing when the fiscal balance improves during the leader's term in office. Moreover, we find 
no indication that larger deficits during an election year (a negative value of BALCH_ey) 
increase the probability of reelection. In fact, in the narrow sample we find a statistically 
significant positive effect of improved fiscal balances during the election year on reelection. That 
is, leaders that reduce the deficit during an election year, relative to the previous year, have a 
higher probability to be reelected. The coefficient in the expanded sample is also positive but not 
statistically significant (p=0.12). 
Economic growth over the leader's term also has a positive effect on the probability of 
reelection, in both samples. It appears that voters attribute better macroeconomic performance, at 
least to some extent, to the functioning of their government, or that stronger macroeconomic 
performance allows governments to expand their services or cut taxes in a sustainable way, and 
by that gain electoral support. These findings contrast with those of Powell and Whitten (1993), 
Paldam (1991), Strom and Lipset (1984) and Lewis-Beck (1988) mentioned in the introduction, 
who found no significant effect. We argue below that this difference in results is explained by 
                                                      
7   Logit equations yielded very similar results. 
   11distinguishing developed from less developed countries.  
In addition to the fiscal and macroeconomic variables, we find that the probability of 
reelection is higher in the developed countries
8 and in countries with a majoritarian electoral 
system. In the narrow sample we also find that the probability of reelection is higher in new 
democracies, as compared to established democracies, but this latter relationship loses its 
significance in the expanded sample where the number of campaigns in new democracies is much 
larger on the one hand, but it includes many campaigns where the leader is not seeking reelection 
personally. 
The differences in the probability of reelection between the various groups of countries, 
along with the findings in the Political Budget Cycle literature that PBCs differ across categories 
of countries, suggest that the effect of deficits and growth on reelection may also vary across 
these country categories, so that in some categories of countries election year deficits, or 
expansionary fiscal policy in general, may be rewarded at the polls, even if they are not in the 
entire sample. The large share of developed and established democracies in the sample (Table 1) 
emphasizes the need for such an examination. 
In Columns 2 and 5 of Table 2 we therefore look separately at the developed countries 
that constitute about two thirds of the narrow sample and one half of the expanded sample. In 
column 2 we find that rising deficits over the term are associated with a lower probability of 
reelection. In column 5 we find that this effect is still in the same direction in the expanded 
sample, but that it loses its statistical significance (p=0.108). These results suggest that there is no 
indication that expansionary fiscal policy helps a leader to get reelected and in fact is likely to 
reduce his chances of reelection. The loss of significance of this coefficient in the expanded 
sample may reflect the fact that in the campaigns that are added to the narrow sample, the deficits 
over the term were generated by the predecessors of politician running as the "incumbent" and 
were therefore rendered as less relevant by the voters.  
The effect on reelection of the change in the fiscal balance in the election year itself is 
positive and statistically significant in both samples. These results show that not only that 
expanding the deficit in an election year is unlikely to increase the probability of reelection, in 
developed countries it is likely to lower this probability. 
                                                      
8   Using the level of GDP per capita, instead of a binary variable for developed and undeveloped 
countries yielded insignificant results and did not affect qualitatively the coefficients of the other 
variables. 
   12The effect of macroeconomic performance on reelection, as reflected in the real growth 
rate of GDP over the term, is not significant in the developed countries, neither in the narrow nor 
in the expanded samples. This finding is consistent with the studies mentioned above, which 
focused on developed countries. It appears that, as found in those studies, voters in developed 
economies do not attribute the economic success of their country to the performance of their 
government, or at least their voting behavior is not significantly affected.  
The findings with respect to the less developed countries (columns 3 and 6) are different 
in some aspects from those for the developed countries. Nevertheless, loose fiscal policies over 
the term are not rewarded in the less developed countries either. The coefficient of the change in 
the budget balance to GDP ratio over the term is positive, and in the expanded sample it is also 
statistically significant. The size of the coefficient is identical in both samples but the additional 
power in the expanded sample (the number of less developed countries' observations almost 
doubles in the expanded sample) overtakes the potential moderating effect of including 
candidates that were not personally in office for the full term before the elections. 
The findings are notably different than those in developed countries for the change in the 
ratio of the fiscal balance to GDP in the election year. The coefficients on this variable are close 
to zero and are far from being statistically significant. On the one hand, these findings suggest 
that voters in less developed countries may be more tolerant towards expanding budget deficits in 
election years, but on the other hand they show that even in these countries, voters do not reward 
election year deficits. 
Finally, economic growth over the term in office is strongly rewarded by voters in the less 
developed countries. Higher growth has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
probability of reelection in both samples. These findings suggest that in the less developed 
countries voters attribute more of the economic success of their country to their leaders. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to explore why this is the case
9, but we note that it is consistent 
with the findings of the World Values Survey.     
Thus, we find out that the relationship between fiscal and macroeconomic performance 
and the probability of reelection, found in the broad sample of countries reflect two distinct 
influences in developed and less developed countries. While loose fiscal policies have a negative 
                                                      
9 We can speculate that it may reflect the more important role of leaders in less developed countries in 
determining the direction of their country or in securing order and stability which are pre-conditions for 
growth, while these are taken for granted in developed countries. 
   13effect on the probability of reelection in both sets of countries, deficit expansions in the election 
year are punished only in the developed countries, while in the undeveloped ones they have no 
significant effect. On the other hand, macroeconomic expansion has a positive significant effect 
on reelection in undeveloped countries and no effect in developed ones. 
 
5. Robustness 
In Table 3 we examine the robustness of these findings to various different specifications.  
Beginning with this table we allow for different effects of the economic variables by multiplying 
each one of them by a binary variable that receives a value of 1 for the respective group of 
countries and a different binary variable for the remaining countries.
10 In columns 1 and 5 we 
verify our results by estimating the equations for the full sample (narrow and expanded one, 
respectively) but allowing different effects of the variables in developed and less developed 
countries; the results match those of Table 2. In column 2 we examine the effect of including 
separately the growth rate of GDP during the election year for two purposes. First, we want to test 
whether including the growth rate in the election year would affect the coefficient of the change 
in the deficit in the election year. Second, we want to find out if growth in the election year has a 
stronger impact on voters than growth in the other years of the leader's term. We find that neither 
of these effects is supported by the data.
11 In column 3 we check the first effect in an alternative 
method by controlling for the deviation of real GDP in the election year from its country specific 
long time trend, which is calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Again, none of the other 
coefficients is affected qualitatively by this addition, nor does the variable's own coefficient has a 
significant positive sign. 
In columns 4 and 6 we test whether the effect of deficits in election years is distinct of that 
of deficits in earlier years. For that purpose we substitute our variable of the deficit over the term, 
which excluded the election year, with a variable that includes the deficit in the election year. We 
then check whether the change in the deficit in the election year has an additional effect. We find 
                                                      
10 For example, the entry BALCH_term*developed in a table refers to the change in the fiscal balance 
during the term in office in developed countries and the entry BALCH_term*less_developed refers to the 
same variable in less developed countries. 
11   It should be noted that the overall effect of growth in the election year in undeveloped countries 
remains positive even if the negative effect of the coefficient of growth in the election year is taken into 
account because its overall effect also includes the influence of growth over the term, which includes the 
election year. 
   14that such an effect exists and that it is positive. That is, not only that improving the fiscal balance 
in general helps reelection, doing so in an election year is even more effective, but only in the 
developed countries. Moreover, we find no evidence for a positive effect of increased election 
year deficits in the undeveloped countries. 
In Table 4 we examine whether various country characteristics that were identified by 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Brender and Drazen (2005a) as affecting PBCs also influence 
the effects of fiscal performance and growth on reelection. In columns 1 and 4 we find that 
controlling for the type of political system – parliamentary vs. presidential - has no qualitative 
effect on the coefficients of the election year deficit and growth. In equations 2 and 5 we 
introduce a control for whether the elections took place in their predetermined date or sooner. We 
find that having the elections in their predetermined data does not change the probability of 
reelection, nor does it affect the impact of the other variables on reelection. Finally, in columns 3 
and 6 we test whether the level of democracy (as characterized in Appendix I) has an effect on 
reelection or the signs of the other coefficients, and find no significant effect. Thus, the positive 
effects of improved fiscal balances in the election year and during the term in developed 
economies, and that of higher GDP growth in the undeveloped countries do not seem to reflect 
these other country characteristics. 
The effects of fiscal policy and macroeconomic performance that we find are not only 
statistically significant, but also quite substantial quantitatively. In Table 5 we report the effect of 
each of our three key variables on the probability of reelection.
12 We find that an increase of 1 
percentage point in the central government surplus ratio to GDP can increase the probability of 
reelection by 3-4.5 percentage points in the developed/established democracies and that an 
increase of 1 percentage point in the surplus during an election year increases the probability of 
reelection by 7-9 percentage points. These magnitudes are broadly in line with those reported in 
Brender (2003) for similar variables in the local elections in Israel. In the less developed 
countries/new democracies raising the average growth rate during the term by 1 percentage point 
is associated with a 7-9 percentage points increase in the probability of reelection. 
 
 
                                                      
12  The probit coefficients cannot be used directly as elasticities or semi-elasticities. The effect of the 
variables is calculated at the averages point for the developed and less developed countries separately.  
   156. Old and New Democracies 
Brender and Drazen (2005a) show that the existence of a statistically significant political 
cycle in fiscal aggregates critically depends on the “newness” of its democratic regime; political 
budget cycles are much more common in the first four elections after the country becomes a 
democracy, than in later elections. In Table 6 we test whether the prevalence of PBCs in new 
democracies is associated with a positive payoff to deficit spending at the polls. We estimate the 
previously specified probit equations on the full samples allowing for different effect of the full-
term and election year budget balance, and of growth in new and old democracies.  
In the old democracies we find that both the full term and the election year increase in the 
ratio of the fiscal surplus to GDP increase the probability of reelection, while the effect of GDP 
growth on reelection is only significant when the expanded sample is used. In equations 3 and 6 
we find that the positive effect of an improvement in the fiscal balance is similar in election and 
non-election years in the old democracies, and equations 2 and 5 show that the relationship 
between changes in the fiscal balances and reelection is not affected qualitatively by controlling 
for growth in the election year. 
In the new democracies – the group of countries for which we found a significant political 
budget cycle in our earlier paper – we find no significant effect of the fiscal balance on the 
probability of reelection. This is an unexpected finding given the results in Brender and Drazen 
(2005a), if one believes that the rationale for the existence of political budget cycle is that 
opportunistic leaders run deficits because it helps (or is believed to help) their reelection 
prospects. The joint findings that PBCs exist in new democracies and that fiscal expansions in 
election years do not raise the probability of reelection suggest that one must find an alternative 
explanation for the observed fiscal expansions in election years in new democracies. We discuss 
this in more detail in section 8. 
We find a significant effect of GDP growth over the term on the probability of reelection 
in new democracies, which is consistent with the importance put on economic growth by 
respondents to the World Values Survey in new democracies. In equations 2 and 5 we find that 
this effect is not stronger if growth takes place during the election year, as compared to earlier 
years in the incumbent's term. This finding contradicts much of the logic behind the PBC 
literature that argues that fiscal expansions during election years are used to accelerate growth 
just before the elections. To summarize, not only are election-year fiscal expansions not rewarded 
   16by voters, even in the group of countries where they are most common, but even growth in the 
election year itself does not affect voters when growth over the entire term is controlled for. 
In Table 7 we allow for a more detailed breakdown of the effects of deficits and growth 
by allowing for different effects in developed and less developed old democracies
13. Deficits are 
punished in old democracies that are developed, while in old democracies which are less 
developed, they are not punished. However, as with all other classifications, we find no indication 
that deficits – either over the term or in the election year – increase the probability of reelection. 
We also find that the positive effect of growth on reelection in the established democracies is 
entirely due to the less developed ones. Equations 2 and 4 show that these effects are robust to the 




7. Political Characteristics and Electoral Systems 
Persson and Tabellini (2003) among others argue that the structure of the political system 
and the electoral system have a substantial effect on the possibility and desire of leaders to 
engage in political manipulation, which would be reflected in PBCs. There are also differences 
between countries in the level (or strength) of their democratic system which may affect the 
degree to which leaders may find it useful to engage in fiscal manipulation and that voters would 
reward it. We therefore test below whether the effects of fiscal balances and growth on reelection 
differ across these categories of countries, and whether there may be a group of countries where 
fiscal expansions during election years are rewarded. In Table 8 we provide the breakdown of the 
samples into the various country categories, and separately for the developed and undeveloped 
countries and for the old and new democracies. We find out that there are very few developed 
countries that use a presidential system and very few elections that took place in developed 
countries at times that democracy was not at the highest level as measured by POLITY IV. We 
also find that there are relatively few new democracies with the highest level of democracy or 
with a majoritarian electoral system. 
In Table 9 we examine whether the effects of deficits and growth on the probability of 
                                                      
13   There are only 11 elections in developed new democracies so we do not present the results with a 
breakdown of the new democracies to developed and undeveloped countries. Estimating the equations 
with this additional breakdown did not change any of the results qualitatively. 
14   The results are similar when we control for the growth rate of real GDP instead of the deviation 
from the trend. 
   17reelection differ across political and electoral system
15. We find that the positive effect of 
improved budget balances during election years remains significant in parliamentary systems in 
developed countries (column 1). The coefficient for the elections conducted in developed 
countries employing the presidential system is of the same magnitude but is not statistically 
significant, perhaps due to the small sample. We also find the same effects in proportional 
election systems while the positive effect in majoritarian elections is not statistically significant 
(column 2). There is no statistically significant effect of the election year fiscal balance in any 
direction in the less developed countries, regardless of the political and electoral system. 
Improved fiscal balances over the term help reelection in parliamentary and majoritarian elections 
in the less developed countries. Finally, growth has a significant positive effect on reelection in 
the less developed countries, regardless of the political and electoral system. Overall, these 
findings suggest that while the political and electoral systems may influence the relationship 
between fiscal performance and reelection, in no case is there evidence that loose fiscal policies, 
or fiscal expansions during an election year, help an incumbent to win. 
In columns 1 and 3 of Table 10 we examine whether the level of democracy (as measured 
by POLITY IV) influences the impact of fiscal performance and growth on reelection. We find 
the same positive relationship between the change in the government budget balance in the 
election year and reelection, although the small number of elections in developed countries with a 
low level of democracy keeps the effect in that group not statistically significant. Among the less 
developed countries we find some indications for a positive effect of reduced deficits over the 
term on reelection in countries with a low level of democracy, and no statistically significant 
effect of the election year deficit. Finally, growth has a positive effect on reelection in the less 
developed countries, regardless of their level of democracy. 
In columns 2 and 4 of the table we check whether there is a difference in these 
relationships between elections that take place on their predetermined date and elections that take 
place “early”.
16  Early elections may reflect an attempt of the incumbent to hold an election when 
he is popular (and presumably the economy is strong), but it may also result from a weakened 
leader being pushed to elections when the economic situation is bad.  Hence the timing may be 
                                                      
15   We present only the results for the narrow sample, but the results in the expanded sample 
(available upon request) are qualitatively the same. 
16   If the election was held in the expected year we classified it as “predetermined”; otherwise it was 
classified as “early”. 
   18endogenous to the growth rate (or some other economic variable), though the sign of the relation 
is not clear ex ante. This endogeneity may in turn affect the relationship between economic 
conditions and the probability that the incumbent is reelected. We find that the directions of the 
relationships are the same regardless of whether the elections are on the their original, 
predetermined date or are held early, although the positive effect of improved fiscal balances 
during the election year on reelection is significantly larger when elections are early.
17
In Table 11 we examine the effects of the political and electoral system on the effects of 
changes in the fiscal balance and growth on reelection in old versus new democracies. We find a 
positive effect of improvements in the fiscal balance on reelection in old democracies with 
parliamentary systems (column 1) and with proportional electoral systems (column 2). The 
positive coefficient in presidential systems is even larger than in parliamentary ones, but the small 
sample may account for its lack of significance. We find no effect of deficits on reelection in new 
democracies, regardless of the political or electoral system, while the effect of growth in these 
countries is significant in both political systems and both electoral systems, while it is not 
significant in any category of old democracies. 
In Table 12 we find the same results with respect to the division of the old and new 
democracies into those with a high level of democracy and those with a low level (columns 1 and 
3). We find again that rising deficits hurt the probability of reelection in old democracies with a 
high level of democracy and do not help it in those with a low level of democracy or in new 
democracies. We also find a positive effect of growth on reelection in the old democracies, at 
both levels of democracy.  
In columns 2 and 4 of the table we show the results with respect to the division of 
elections in old and new democracies into those that were held on the scheduled 
(“predetermined”) date and those that were held early.  We find that when there are early 
elections, an improved fiscal balance in new democracies helps reelection, while when the 
elections were held on the originally scheduled date the effect is not statistically significant.
18  
Since we use annual data in our sample, the effects of budget deficits on reelection could 
                                                      
17   The coefficient on election year fiscal balance is 36.8 for early elections versus 16.5 for elections 
held on the scheduled date in the narrow sample and 33.2 for early versus 13.9 for elections on the 
scheduled date in the expanded sample. Note, However, as shown in Section 5, early elections are not 
associated with a higher probability of reelection (Table 5). 
18    One possibility is that the leaders who succeed in lowering the deficit may be the ones who call 
early elections, while those who do not are more likely to postpone elections as long as possible. 
   19be "clouded" by campaigns that take place in the early parts of the year, if the government 
expanded the deficit in the previous year or took corrective measure in the later part of the year, 
after the elections. While Brender and Drazen (2005a) find no evidence that larger fiscal 
expansions take place in election years in which the elections are in the later part of the year, we 
allowed for varying effects of the deficit if the elections are in the first half of the year, or in the 
second half. We find that there is no statistically significant positive effect of the deficit in the 
election year on reelection, even among the new democracies, either when the elections are in the 
first half of the year or in the second half. 
In Table 13 we show that the positive effects of improved fiscal balances on reelection in 
old democracies reflect the behavior of the old developed democracies, while the effects in the 
less developed old democracies are not statistically significant. We also find that the positive 
effect of growth in established democracies is entirely due to the experience of the less developed 
established democracies, while in the established developed democracies the effect is far from 
being significant. These results are repeated in Table 14 with respect to the different levels of 
democracy and the type of elections: predetermined or early. Again, there is no group of countries 
in which there is a statistically significant positive effect of budget deficits – either in the election 
year or over the term – on the probability of reelection. 
 
8. Alternative Explanations  
To characterize our main finding in a sentence: voters, especially in developed countries 
and established democracies, do not like deficits, particularly in election-years.  The negative 
electoral effect of deficits in some groups of countries and the lack of a significant positive effect 
in any group of countries seems quite clear. Are there alternative interpretations of our findings? 
One of the questions that may arise with respect to these findings is that of causality. It 
may be argued that strong leaders have the political power to conduct conservative fiscal policies 
(see, for example, Roubini and Sachs (1989)) and at the same time have a better chance to be 
reelected. In order to control, at least to some extent, for this possibility we collected data on the 
share of the votes received by each leader in the previous election and his party’s strength in the 
legislature, taking into account various aspects of the nature of the electoral system. When the 
leader is elected directly, the vote share he received in the previous election gives some indication 
   20of his popularity and thus his political strength.
19 In a parliamentary system, the percent of seats 
in the parliament held by the leader's party may, in a similar way, represent his popularity and 
indicate his ability to carry out his program. In Table 15 we show that none of the relationships 
we identified above is affected by the inclusion of these variables, although the additional 
variables have the expected, statistically significant, effect on the probability of reelection
20. 
These findings suggest that the effect of improved fiscal positions on reelection is not merely a 
reflection of the use of the leader's political power to better control fiscal developments. 
Another explanation of our findings is that voters are not bothered so much by deficits per 
se, but by inflation which itself is often caused by deficit spending. Shiller (1996), Lewis-Beck 
(1988) and Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998), among others, find evidence that voters dislike 
inflation and punish governments that create it. To control for this possibility we added in Table 
16 the inflation rate in the election year, the change in the inflation rate during the election year 
and the average inflation rate during the leader's term in office. We find that all these variables 
have a statistically significant negative effect on the probability of reelection in the developed 
countries, and no effect in the less-developed ones. However, the inclusion of these variables 
does not affect the relationship between the fiscal and growth variables and the probability of 
reelection.  That is, our finding of dislike of deficits reflects more than dislike of inflation. 
An alternative explanation for our finding that growth has no effect on the probability of 
reelection in developed countries may be that it is due to the significant impact of global 
economic developments on the growth performance of these countries. If this is the case, it may 
still be that voters reward policy induced growth, but this component would not be observable in 
the data due to the dominant effect of global factors.  
To test this possibility we try to separate the effects of global economic developments by 
running a regression of the real growth rate of per-capita GDP during the leader's term on the 
product of the real growth rate of world GDP and the share of exports of goods and services in 
the country's GDP (both variables taken from the WDI). We estimated these regressions 
                                                      
19   In some of the countries that have a presidential system it is not trivial to match the president with 
a specific party, or even with a group of parties. We also tested the effects of the size of the coalition in the 
year before the elections and (jointly) the proportion of seats held by the leader's party within the coalition 
representation. This variable did not have a significant effect on the probability of reelection and did not 
affect any of the other coefficients. 
20 We show  in columns 1 and 5 that the results are not affected by the decrease in the number of 
available observations due to the inclusion of this variable. 
   21separately for developed and less developed countries. We then entered, separately, the predicted 
values from these regressions and the residual growth rates into our original regressions, instead 
of our original growth variable. In this way, the first variable GLOBAL_gr captures the effect of 
global developments while the second, DOMESTIC_gr captures mostly domestically induced 
growth. We use the same coefficient for all the countries in the group because a stronger or 
weaker response in a country to global developments may itself be a policy outcome .
The results of this estimation are reported in Table 17. We find that in the developed 
countries neither the effect of global growth nor the effect of domestically induced growth is 
statistically significant. This finding may suggest that in these countries even the domestic 
component of growth is attributed to the success of the business sector, rather than to the 
performance of the government. In the less developed countries we find that the global 
(exogenous) component of growth does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
probability of reelection, while the domestic component is the one that accounts for the highly 
significant effect of growth that we find. This is consistent with a rational behavior of voters that 
reward their leaders only for growth that is related to domestic factors, which may be more 
reflective of their own performance. Finally, in both developed and less developed countries the 
division of growth into the domestic and global components did not affect qualitatively any of the 
other coefficients. 
Our findings for new democracies raise another question when compared with those of 
Brender and Drazen (2005a) on the existence of political budget cycles. There we found that 
political cycles in fiscal aggregates exist only in new democracies and that in these countries the 
effect is entirely due to higher expenditures in the election year.
21 In this paper we find that even 
in elections that take place in new democracies there are no indications that fiscal expansions in 
the election year increase an incumbent's probability of reelection, either directly or via higher 
election year growth (see Table 4).  Why then would rational politicians in new democracies 
engage in systematic fiscal expansions in election years, as found in our earlier paper?  
                                                      
21   In Table 17 we also test whether voters are sensitive to the source of fiscal expansion. We find 
that there is no statistically significant difference in the effect of deficits that are created by higher 
expenditures and those that created by lower revenue, although in the developed countries the effect of 
revenue reductions (as a share of GDP) is somewhat larger.  
 
   22One possible explanation of these joint findings is that the fiscal expansions in election 
years in new democracies do not represent an attempt to gain voter support for the leader but 
reflect expenditures incurred in an attempt to consolidate democracy. As described in Brender 
and Drazen (2005b, in progress), democracy is often not “consolidated” in new democracies, that 
is, it is not accepted unconditionally by all citizens. We argue that an election year may be an 
especially dangerous time for the existence of the democracy itself, and thus may be a time when 
leaders have to spend money to retain popular support for the democratic regime to prevent its 
overthrow or subversion and the return to an autocratic system.  We would then observe higher 
expenditures and deficits in an election year, but without fiscal expansion necessarily gaining 
votes for the incumbent over the challenger.  Testing this hypothesis empirically is beyond the 
scope of this paper, but further conceptual discussion can be found in the above mentioned paper.  
 
9. Conclusions 
In this paper we step backwards in the chain of reasoning underlying the opportunistic 
political budget cycle to test whether an increase in the government's budget deficit during an 
election year actually helps the incumbent get reelected.  We find no evidence that this is the case 
in any of the groupings of countries we examine. This includes: developed countries, less 
developed countries; new and old democracies; countries with presidential or parliamentary 
government systems; countries with proportional or majoritarian electoral systems; and, countries 
with different levels of democracy. We also find that it makes no difference for the results 
whether the elections take place at their originally scheduled date or are called early. 
In fact, we find that in developed countries and established democracies election-year 
deficit spending and tax cuts are punished at the polls. A worsening of the government’s fiscal 
balance in the election year actually reduces the probability that the leader is reelected.  
We find similar results for the effect of budget deficits in the earlier years of an 
incumbent's term in office. In most countries loose fiscal policies over the incumbent’s term of 
office – reflected in larger budget deficits relative to earlier periods – are also associated with a 
statistically significant lower probability of reelection. Even when one cannot find a significantly 
lower probability, there is no evidence that deficits raise the probability of reelection. That is, in 
groupings of countries, deficits either lower the probability of reelection or have no statistically 
significant effect either way. The findings with respect to election year budget deficits may 
simply mirror negative voter reaction to budget deficits in other years as well. To the extent that 
   23voters dislike deficits in general (that is, they are “fiscal conservatives”), it is probably especially 
difficult to persuade them that they are “good” in an election year. Such fiscal conservatism 
would lead rational voters to view election-year deficits as clear and costly electoral manipulation 
and react quite negatively. 
We also find that strong macroeconomic performance, reflected in higher growth rates of 
real GDP per-capita, is associated with a higher probability of reelection only in the less 
developed countries and in the new democracies. Consistent with previous studies (other than in 
the US) we do not find significant effects of growth on reelection in developed countries. We also 
found that in the less-developed countries voters are affected by the overall growth performance 
over the leader's term in office, but with no additional effect for growth in the election year itself. 
This finding is not consistent with the proposition in the political business cycle literature that 
leaders could gain voter support by manipulating the economy to grow faster in election years.  
Moreover, the effects we find are not only statistically significant, but also quite 
substantial quantitatively. An increase of 1 percentage point in the central government surplus 
ratio to GDP can increase the probability of reelection by 3-4.5 percentage points in the 
developed/established democracies and an increase of 1 percentage point in the surplus during an 
election year increases the probability of reelection by 7-9 percentage points. 
Our results should raise further questions about the existence of political cycles in fiscal 
aggregates and especially in deficits as a widespread occurrence.  We are not arguing that 
election-year political manipulation does not exist as a general phenomenon. It may take the form 
of changing the composition but not the level of expenditures (as in Drazen and Eslava [2005a]) 
or in targeting some voters at the expense of others so as not to increase the overall deficit (as in 
Drazen and Eslava [2005b]).  But, our results say clearly that running deficits in an election year 
is not an effective tool to help reelection and in fact is punished at the polls in developed 
countries that are established democracies. Politicians, take note! 
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   26Data Appendix
The data used in this study were collected from several sources covering economic, fiscal and political 
data. We also used information on institutional characteristics of countries, the timing of elections and data 
related to the party association and career circumstances of country leaders. The data sources which were 
used in this study are listed in Table A-1. 
 
The Sample  
The fiscal and economic data from the IFS and GFS are available for the years 1960-2003, and for many 
countries the period covered is shorter. We therefore restrict our sample to that period, even though 
election years and election results data are available for a longer period. 
To restrict our sample only to democracies, we include only the years in which the country has a non-
negative score in the POLITY democracy index. That index is calculated as the sum of the scores that each 
country receives in each year on two scales: the degree of democracy (a 0 to 10 scale) and the degree of 
autocracy ( a 0 to -10 scale). 
In the former socialist economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union we exclude the 
observations for the first two years after transition, as they may represent the simultaneous effect of the 
shift to democracy and the collapse of central planning, rather than political manipulation of fiscal 
variables. The countries and the years which are included in the sample are listed in Table A-2. 
Our final sample, used for the estimation, consists only of election years in the sample period. The 
information on election dates were collected from the IDEA dataset "Voter Turnout Since 1945" and 
complemented by data from the CDP, IFES and the CIA's "World Factbook".
22 In Presidential systems, 
we used only presidential elections and in Parliamentary systems only parliamentary ones. The 
identification of the political system was according to whether the chief executive responsible for 
economic policy is elected directly by the public (presidential) or by parliament (Parliamentary), as in 
Persson and Tabellini (2002). For example, France is defined as parliamentary since it is the government 
and the prime-minister– elected by the legislature - which are dominant in determining economic policy, 
rather than the president. These definitions are based on the variable SYSTEM in the DPI dataset. All the 
election years in the sample are listed in Table A-3. 
 
                                                      
22 Additional sources that were used to complement the data on election dates were: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
(www.wikipedia.org);  African Elections Database  http://africanelections.tripod.com/index.html) and Lijphart 
Elections Archive, in University of California, San Diego (http://dodgson.ucsd.edu/lij). 
   27 
 
Fiscal Years 
In those countries in which the fiscal years are not the calendar years, we adjusted all the data to the fit the 
fiscal years. For example, in Canada the fiscal year starts on April 1
st and ends at March 31
st the  following 
year. Hence, elections on March 2009 will be in the 2008 fiscal year. Data about fiscal years are from the 
IFS, supplemented by GFS data when information is missing in the IFS data. 
 
The Reelection Variable 
The dependent variable is Reelect – A binary variable receiving the value 1 if an incumbent leader is 
reelected in the elections. Data on the names of leaders and their party association were primarily based on 
ZPC data. The DPI provides data on the term of the leader in office, which allowed us to identify points of 
change in the leadership of the country, and whether those were election dates or not.  
We built the variable in two different ways, constructing a narrow sample and an expanded one (in the 
expanded sample we add observations that were missing values in the Narrow Sample but we do not 
change any of the observations in the narrow sample). 
The Narrow Sample includes observations in which: 
∗  The leader has been in office, at least, in the two budgetary years preceding the election year. 
∗  The leader stayed in office at least until one month before the elections; if he quits within the month 
before the elections Reelect receives the value 0. 
∗  There is no legal limit on the leader's term (based on the variable MULTPL in the DPI
23), otherwise 
the observation is excluded. Data on legal limits on leaders' term in office are taken from the DPI. 
The Expanded Sample also includes: 
∗  Leaders who left their position less than 365 days before the elections In these cases Reelect receives 
the value 0. 
∗  Candidates replacing leaders that were subject to a legal limit, forcing them to quit at the end of their 
term. In these cases, Reelect receives the value 1 if the reigning leader's party is winning in the 
elections and 0 if it loses. 
                                                      
23 For missing years we assumed that the legal limit remained as in the closest year in the sample. 
   28∗  Leaders replacing a previous leader who died in the election year or in the preceding it. In these cases 
the replacing leader is considered as continuing the original leader's term. 
 
Fiscal Policy Variables 
The fiscal policy variables are calculated on the basis of IFS variables, supplemented by GFS data when 
needed. In some cases we used alternative sources, as detailed in Brender and Drazen (2005c, the BOI 
discussion paper) Table A-I-1. 
Balance is the difference between the central government's Total Revenue & Grants and Total 
Expenditure (i.e., the fiscal surplus) for each country in each year. All these variables are presented as a 
percentage of GDP which is also taken from the IFS. 
Using Balance we calculated BALCH_term, BALCH_ey and BALCH_term+ey,  in the following way: 
BAL0 is the value of Balance in the election year and BAL-i is the value of Balance i years before the 
elections. 
•  BALCH_term = ½ * (BAL-1 + BAL-2) – ½ * ( BAL-3 + BAL-4); which is the change in the average 
central government balance in the two years preceding the elections (not including the election year) 
compared to the previous two years. 
* Where there are no data on  BAL-3 and BAL-4 then: BALCH_term = BAL-1 - BAL-2 
•  BALCH_ey = BAL0 - BAL-1; which is the change in the balance in the election year relative to the 
previous year. 
•  BALCH_term+ey = ⅓ * (BAL0 + BAL-1 + BAL-2) – ⅓ * (BAL-3 + BAL-4 + BAL-5); which is the 
change in the average balance to GDP ratio in the last 3 years of the term, including the elections year, 
compared to the previous 3 years. 
* if there are no data on  BAL-3 , BAL-4 and BAL-5 then: 
  BALCH_term+ey = ½ * (BAL0 + BAL-1) – BAL-2 
Economic Variables 
The economic growth calculation is based on: GDPPC, real per-capita GDP for each country in each year, 
which is taken from the WDI dataset of the World Bank. 
Using GDPPC we calculate: GDPPC_gr and GDPPC_gr_ey in the following way: 
   29GDPPC0 is the value of GDPPC  in the election year, GDPPC -1 is the value of GDPPC in the previous 
year and GDPPC -x is the value of GDPPC in the year in which the leader assumed his office (usually the 
previous election year), where x is the number of years in office: 
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* In the Expanded sample GDPPC0 receives the value of GDPPC -1 if the leader left his office in the year 
preceding the election year. 
 
Economic Control Variables 
GDP_trend is the trend of real GDP (country specific) which was computed using the Hodrick-Prescott 
filter on the "GDP in constant 1995 US$" series of the WDI. Using this variable we calculated for each 
country in every year the deviation of real GDP from its trend, and used it in the following way to 
compute the change in this deviation in the election year: 
GDP0 and GDP_trend0 are the values of GDP and GDP_trend  in the election year, and GDP-1 and 
GDP_trend-1 are the values of these variables in the year preceding the election year: 

















INF is the inflation rate for each country in each year, which is taken from the WDI dataset of the World 
Bank, supplemented by IFS data when needed. 
Using INF we calculated INFCH_ey and Average_INF in the following way: 
INF0  is the value of INF in the election year, INF-i is the value of INF i years before the elections and 
INF -x is the value of INF in the year in which the leader assumed his office (usually the previous election 
year), where x is the number of years in office: 
•  INFCH_ey = INF0 - INF-1; which is the change in the inflation rate in the election year relative to the 
previous year. 




























i X ; which is the average inflation rate during the 
leader's term. 
* In the Expanded sample INF0 receives the value of INF -1 if the leader left his office in the year 
preceding the election year. 
 
In the final dataset we truncated the extreme values, and gave all values above the truncation point of a 
variable the value of the truncation point. The truncation points are: 
For INF – in developed countries: 20%, in less developed countries: 60%. 
For INFCH_ey – in less developed countries: 60%. 
For Average_INF – in less developed countries: 80%. 
In those cases where the inflation variable was truncated we added a binary variable with a value of 1 in 
the countries with high inflation. However, where these variables turned out not to be significant and not 
to affect the other coefficients, we dropped them from the final specification. 
 
Political Strength Control Variables 
The political strength variables for each country in each election year are mainly based on DPI data about 
the number of seats that the leader's party holds in parliament and the percent of votes that the president 
received in the previous elections (both in the first and the last rounds).These variables (GOVSEAT, 
OPPSEAT, PERCENT1, PERCENTL in DPI)  are available for the period 1975-2000. For the other years: 
1961-1975 and 2001-2003, we used data from IDEA and completed missing information from CDP: 
PARTY - the percent of seats in the parliament held by the leader's party in the year preceding the election 
year. It receives the value 0 in a presidential system (in cases where data are from IDEA it is the 
proportion of the public's votes received by the party). 
VOTES - the percent of votes for the leader in a presidential system in the first round of the previous 
elections; receives the value 0 in a parliamentary system. 
VOTES_R2 - the percent of the votes for the leader in a presidential system in the last round of the 
previous elections (usually the second round); receives the value 0 in a parliamentary system and the value 
of VOTES if there was no second round. 
   31D_R2 - A binary variable receiving the value 1 for a leader in a presidential system who had to run in a 
second round in the previous elections. 
 
New vs. Old Democracies 
New_Democracy – A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 for the 
period of the first 4 elections after a country with a negative polity value in the POLITY IV dataset shifted 
to non-negative values, not counting the elections in the transition year. Otherwise, the country is defined 
as an Old Democracy and the variable receives a value of 0. 
Old – A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 if country is defined 
as an Old Democracy in that year. The years in which countries are defined as New Democracies are listed 
in Table A-2. 
 
Developed vs. Less Developed Countries 
Developed – A binary variable, for each country, receiving the value 1 for OECD economies that were 
members of the organization during the entire sample period. 
Less_Developed – A binary variable, for each country, receiving the value 1 for all the countries that are 
not defined as developed. The Developed countries are listed in Table A-2. 
 
Presidential vs. Parliamentary Constitutional Rules 
Based on the constitutional rules defined above we calculated the following variables: 
Pres - A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 in a country with a 
Presidential system, and 0 otherwise. 
Parl - A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 in a country with a 
Parliamentary system, and 0 otherwise. 
The constitutional rules of the various countries are listed in Table A-2. 
 
Proportional vs. Majoritarian Electoral Rules 
The  DPI provides information, in each country and in each election year, whether candidates for 
presidency or parliament are elected based on the total share of votes received by their party or on the 
   32majority of votes in each voting zone (e.g., district). In the former case the electoral system is defined in 
the DPI as Proportional representation (PR in the DPI) and in the latter as Majoritarian representation. 
Prop – A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 in a country with a 
Proportional electoral system and 0 otherwise. 
Maj – A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 in a country with a 
Majoritarian electoral system, and 0 otherwise. 
The electoral systems of the countries are listed in Table A-2. 
  
Level of Democracy 
We split the sample between countries with a polity score (in the DPI) of 0 to 9 and those with a score of 
10. More than 50 percent of the data points represent countries with a score of 10. Where the score 
changed during the covered period, we split the data points for that country according to the score in each 
year. Based on the distinction between the two levels we computed the following variables: 
High – A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 where the polity 
score is 10. 
Low – A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 where the polity 
score is between 0 and 9. 
 
Predetermined vs. Early Elections 
Based on the legally determined frequency of elections in a country (from the CIA's "World Factbook"), 
we identified when the next elections should have been held. If the elections were held in the expected 
year we classified them as predetermined; otherwise they were classified as early (or endogenous). 
Pred – A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 if the elections are 
defined as predetermined. 
Early – A binary variable, for each country in each election year, receiving the value 1 if the elections are 
defined as early. 
   33Table A-1: Data Sources
Source Name Code Dataset Producer Date Variables
Available 
Years
International Financial Statistics IFS International Monetary Fund 2003 central government total expenditure and 
total revenue and grants; nominal GDP
1960-2003
Government Financial Statistics GFS International Monetary Fund 2003 central government total expenditure and 
total revenue and grants
1960-2003
World Development Indicators WDI The World Bank 2003 GDP per capita in constant 1995 US$, 
GDP in constant 1995 US$
1960-2003
POLITY IV POLITY University of Maryland 2003 Level of Democracy index 1800-2003
Database of Political Institutions DPI The World Bank 2000 political system, term limits, election 
results and the allocation of seats in 
parliament, election system.
1975-2000
Voter Turnout Since 1945 to 
Date
IDEA Institute for Democracy 
and Electoral Assistance
Current election years, election results 1945-2001
The Center on Democratic 
Performance
CDP Binghamton University Current election years, election results, election 
dates
1974-2000
Electionguide.org IFES International Foundation 
for Electoral Systems
Current election dates 1998-2005
World Political Leaders ZPC Zárate's Political 
Collections
Current leaders' names and their party association 1945-2005
The World Factbook CIA Central Intelligence AgencyCurrent election dates, frequency of elections in 
a country, political system
1960-2005Table A2: Sample Characteristics.
No. Country
Years Included in the 
Expanded Sample
Elections in the 
Narrow sample
1









Years as a New Democracy 
in the Sample
1 Argentina 1983-2003 3 (3) 1 (1) X 1983-2003
2 Australia 1961-2002 13 1 X X X
3 Austria 1960-1999 7 1 X X X
4 Belgium 1960-1998 8 1 X X X
5 Bolivia 1985-2003 0 4 (3) X 1982-1997
6 Brazil 1985-1994 0 1 (1) X 1985-1994
7 Bulgaria 1990-2003 1 (1) 0 X 1990-2003
8 Canada 1965-2001 7 2 X X
9 Chile 1960-1972, 1989-2000 0 3 (2) 1989-2000
10 Colombia 1971-2003 0 7 X
11 Costa Rica 1972-2002 0 8 X
12 Cyprus 1975-2003 5 (1) 0 X 1975-1983
13 Czech Republic 1993-2003 2 (2) 0 X X 1993-2002
14 Denmark 1960-2000 11 0 X X X
15 Dominican Republic 1978-2000 2 (2) 4 (2) X 1978-1994
16 Ecuador 1979-2003 0 5 (4) X 1979-1996
17 El Salvador 1984-2000 0 3 (3) X 1984-2000
18 Estonia 1991-2001 0 1 (1) X X 1991-2001
19 Fiji 1970-1986, 1990-1999 4 (4) 0 X 1970-1986, 1990-1999
20 Finland 1960-1998 7 0 X X X
21 France 1972-1997 5 0 X X X+
22 Georgia 1998-2002 1 (1) 0 X 1998-2002
23 Germany 1971-1998 6 1 X X X
24 Greece 1960-1966, 1975-1999 4 (2) 1 X X* X 1975-1989
25 Guatemala 1966-1973, 1986-2003 0 4 (4) X 1966-1973, 1986-2003
26 Guyana 1966-1979, 1992-1997 2 (2) 1 (1) X* X 1966-1979, 1992-1997
27 Honduras 1982-2000 0 3 (3) X 1982-1997
28 Hungary 1990-2003 2 (2) 1 (1) X X 1990-2003
29 Iceland 1972-2003 8 0 X X X
30 India 1960-2001 5 3 X X 1960-1967
31 Ireland 1960-2002 10 0 X X X
32 Israel 1961-1972, 1974-1984, 
1986-2001
6 3 X* X
33 Italy 1960-1998 6 0 X X X
34 Jamaica 1975-1985, 2000-2002 2 0 X
35 Japan 1970-1993 5 1 X X X
36 Korea 1963-1971, 1988-1997 1 (1) 1 (1) X* X 1963-1971, 1988-1997
37 Lithuania 1993-2002 2 (2) 0 X 1993-2002
38 Luxembourg 1970-1974, 1976-1997 5 0 X X X
39 Madagascar 1992-2001 2 (2) 0 X 1992-2001Table A2: Cont.
No. Country
Years Included in the 
Expanded Sample
Elections in the 
Narrow sample
1









Years as a New Democracy 
in the Sample
40 Malaysia 1960-1999 7 (3) 1 X 1960-1978
41 Mali 1992-2003 1 (1) 1 (1) 1992-2003
42 Mauritius 1981-2003 5 0 X
43 Mexico 1988-2003 0 2 (2) X 1988-2003
44 Moldova 1997-2001 1 (1) 0 X 1997-2001
45 Mongolia 1990-1992, 1994-2003 2 (2) 0 1990-2003
46 Nepal 1990-2001 1 (1) 0 X 1990-2001
47 Netherlands 1960-1998 7 0 X X X
48 New zealand 1960-1988, 1990-2001 10 2 X X X+
49 Nicaragua 1990-2003 2 (2) 0 X 1990-2003
50 Norway 1960-2003 5 2 X X X
51 Pakistan 1988-1998 2 (2) 1 (1) X 1988-1998
52 Panama 1989-2000 0 2 (2) X 1989-2000
53 Papua new Guinie 1975-2002 5 (3) 0 X 1975-1992
54 Paraguay 1989-2003 2 (2) 1 (1) X 1989-2003
55 Peru 1980-1999 1 (1) 2 (2) X 1980-1999
56 Philipines 1960-1971, 1987-2003 2 1 (1) 1987-2003
57 Poland 1991-2001 2 (2) 0 X 1989-2001
58 Portugal 1976-1998 5 (3) 0 X X* X 1976-1987
59 Romania 1990-2001 1 (1) 0 X X 1990-2001
60 Russia 1995-2001 0 1 (1) X 1992-2001
61 Slovak Republic 1994-2003 2 (2) 0 X X 1994-2003
62 Slovenia 1993-2003 0 1 (1) X X 1993-2003
63 Solomon Islands 1978-1990, 1993-1999 2 (1) 0 X 1978-1990
64 South Africa 1994-2003 1 0 X
65 Spain 1978-2003 5 (2) 0 X X X 1978-1989
66 Sri Lanka 1960-2001 5 (1) 1 X* X+ 1960-1965
67 Sweden 1961-2000 10 1 X X X
68 Thailand 1978-1990, 1992-2003 4 (2) 0 X 1978-1990
69 Trinidad & Tobago 1962-1972, 1976-1989, 
1993-1995
31 X
70 Turkey 1976-1979, 1983-2001 5 (4) 0 X X X 1976-1979, 1983-1995
71 United Kindom 1960-1999 8 0 X X
72 United States 1960-2003 7 3 X
73 Uruguay 1985-2001 0 2 (2) X 1985-2001
74 Venezuela 1960-2001 0 6 (3) X 1960-1978
 1 The number in the parentheses indicates the number of elections that took place in a country during the years it is defined as a "new democracy".
 * Some of the Elections are in a Presidential System
 + Some of the Elections are in a Majoritarian SystemTable A3: Detailed Sample and Data Characteristics.
No. Country Election Years in the Narrow Sample
Additional Election Years in the Expanded 
Sample
Cases in Which the Leader 
was Reelected in the 
Narrow Sample 
1
Additional Cases in Which 
the Leader was Reelected in 






1 Argentina 1995, 1999, 2003 1989 1 / 3 0 / 1 -2.4 0.1
2 Australia 1964, 1970, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1981, 1983, 1985, 
1988, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2002
1967 9 / 13 0 / 1 -0.8 0.0
3 Austria 1966, 1970, 1979, 1983, 1990, 1994, 1999 1986 4 / 7 0 / 1 -4.3 0.2
4 Belgium 1965, 1968, 1971, 1977, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995 1981 6 / 8 0 / 1 -5.3 -0.2
5 Bolivia .. 1989, 1993, 1997, 2002 .. 0 / 4 -3.5 -1.9
6 Brazil .. 1994 .. 0 / 1 -3.3 4.2
7 Bulgaria 2001 .. 0 / 1 0 / 0 -3.8 0.6
8 Canada 1968, 1972, 1974, 1979, 1988, 1997, 2000 1984, 1993 6 / 7 0 / 2 -1.8 0.2
9 Chile .. 1970, 1993, 1999 .. 1 / 3 -1.1 -1.8
10 Colombia .. 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998 .. 3 / 7 -3.7 0.4
11 Costa Rica .. 1974, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994, 1998, 
2002
.. 3 / 8 3.6 -0.4
12 Cyprus 1983, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 .. 2 / 5 0 / 0 -4.3 -0.7
13 Czech Republic 1996, 2002 .. 1 / 2 0 / 0 -1.4 -0.2
14 Denmark 1964, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1975, 1977, 1979, 1984, 
1987, 1990, 1998
.. 8 / 11 0 / 0 0.7 -0.2
15 Dominican Republic 1990, 1994 1982, 1986, 1996, 2000 2 / 2 1 / 4 -0.3 0.2
16 Ecuador .. 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2002 .. 0 / 5 -0.4 1.1
17 El Salvador .. 1989, 1994, 1999 .. 2 / 3 -1.4 -0.2
18 Estonia .. 1995 .. 0 / 1 0.8 -2.5
19 Fiji 1977, 1982, 1994, 1999 .. 3 / 4 0 / 0 -3.8 -1.8
20 Finland 1966, 1970, 1975, 1979, 1987, 1991, 1995 .. 0 / 7 0 / 0 -0.6 -1.3
21 France 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1997 .. 1 / 5 0 / 0 -1.8 -0.3
22 Georgia 2000 .. 1 / 1 0 / 0 -1.3 0.6
23 Germany 1976, 1980, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1998 1983 4 / 6 0 / 1 -1.1 0.1
24 Greece 1963, 1985, 1989, 1993 1996 1 / 4 0 / 1 -5.8 -1.8
25 Guatemala .. 1970, 1995, 1999, 2003 .. 0 / 4 -1.2 -0.2
26 Guyana 1968, 1973 1997 2 / 2 0 / 1 -8.2 -4.2
27 Honduras .. 1989, 1993, 1997 .. 1 / 3 -4.5 -1.1
28 Hungary 1998, 2002 1994 0 / 2 0 / 1 -5.0 -2.0
29 Iceland 1974, 1978, 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2003 .. 3 / 8 0 / 0 -1.1 -0.4
30 India 1970, 1976, 1989, 1996, 1999 1967, 1979, 1984 2 / 5 2 / 3 -1.8 -0.2
31 Ireland 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977, 1981, 1987, 1989, 1992, 
1997, 2002
.. 4 / 10 0 / 0 -5.8 -0.3
32 Israel 1965, 1977, 1981, 1992, 1999, 2001 1969, 1984, 1996 2 / 6 1 / 3 -6.0 -0.2
33 Italy 1963, 1967, 1972, 1979, 1987, 1992 .. 1 / 6 0 / 0 -6.0 0.5
34 Jamaica 1980, 1983 .. 1 / 2 0 / 0 -6.6 -4.5
35 Japan 1972, 1976, 1986, 1989, 1993 1979 1 / 5 0 / 1 -3.4 -0.7
36 Korea 1967 1997 1 / 1 0 / 1 1.2 0.1
37 Lithuania 1997, 2002 .. 0 / 2 0 / 0 -1.9 0.5
38 Luxembourg 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, 1994 .. 1 / 5 0 / 0 2.7 0.8
34 Madagascar 1996, 2001 .. 0 / 2 0 / 0 -4.4 -0.2
35 Malaysia 1969, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1995, 1999 1982 7 / 7 0 / 1 -4.5 -0.8
39 Madagascar 1996, 2001 .. 0 / 2 0 / 0 -4.4 -0.2
40 Malaysia 1969, 1974, 1978, 1986, 1990, 1995, 1999 1982 7 / 7 0 / 1 -4.5 -0.8
41 Mali 1997 2002 1 / 1 0 / 1 -3.4 0.3
42 Mauritius 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2001 .. 3 / 5 0 / 0 -2.1 -0.9Table A3: Cont.
No. Country Election Years in the Narrow Sample Sample was Reelected in the  the Leader was Reelected in  Balance 
2 BALCH_ey 
3
43 Mexico .. 1994, 2000 .. 1 / 2 -1.6 -0.1
44 Moldova 2001 .. 0 / 1 0 / 0 -1.8 1.5
45 Mongolia 1997, 2001 .. 1 / 2 0 / 0 -1.8 0.1
46 Nepal 1995 .. 0 / 1 0 / 0 -5.7 0.0
47 Netherlands 1971, 1977, 1981, 1986, 1989, 1994, 1998 .. 4 / 7 0 / 0 -2.0 0.2
48 New zealand 1963, 1966, 1969, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1994, 
1997, 2000
1972, 1975 8 / 10 0 / 2 -1.3 -0.4
49 Nicaragua 1996, 2001 .. 0 / 2 0 / 0 -2.6 -1.8
50 Norway 1965, 1969, 1985, 1989, 1993 1981, 1997 3 / 5 0 / 2 2.9 0.6
51 Pakistan 1991, 1997 1994 2 / 2 0 / 1 -5.9 -0.8
52 Panama .. 1994, 1999 .. 0 / 2 0.5 0.1
53 Papua new Guinie 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, 2002 .. 1 / 5 0 / 0 -1.9 -0.5
54 Paraguay 1993, 2003 1998 0 / 2 1 / 1 -0.1 0.8
55 Peru 1995 1985, 1990 1 / 1 0 / 2 -3.3 -0.2
56 Philipines 1965, 1969 1998 1 / 2 0 / 1 -1.3 -1.8
57 Poland 1995, 2000 .. 1 / 2 0 / 0 -3.5 -0.2
58 Portugal 1980, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995 .. 3 / 5 0 / 0 -6.1 -0.7
59 Romania 1996 .. 0 / 1 0 / 0 -2.3 -1.3
60 Russia .. 2000 .. 0 / 1 -2.3 2.7
61 Slovak Republic 1998, 2002 .. 1 / 2 0 / 0 -2.2 -1.5
62 Slovenia .. 2000 .. 1 / 1 -1.0 -0.6
63 Solomon Islands 1989, 1997 .. 0 / 2 0 / 0 -4.0 -3.0
64 South Africa 1999 .. 0 / 1 0 / 0 -3.1 0.4
65 Spain 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000 .. 4 / 5 0 / 0 -3.6 0.6
66 Sri Lanka 1965, 1970, 1977, 1988, 1999 1994 1 / 5 0 / 1 -7.4 0.4
67 Sweden 1965, 1969, 1974, 1977, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992, 
1994, 1998
1980 6 / 10 0 / 1 0.0 0.0
68 Thailand 1983, 1986, 1995, 2000 .. 2 / 4 0 / 0 -0.8 1.0
69 Trinidad & Tobago 1971, 1986, 1995 1981 1 / 3 1 / 1 -0.6 -1.4
70 Turkey 1977, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999 .. 2 / 5 0 / 0 -5.8 -2.1
71 United Kindom 1966, 1970, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1987, 1992, 1997 .. 4 / 8 0 / 0 -1.0 0.0
72 United States 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1992, 1996 1964, 1988, 2000 3 / 7 2 / 3 -2.0 0.2
73 Uruguay .. 1994, 1999 .. 1 / 2 -1.4 -2.5
74 Venezuela .. 1968, 1973, 1978, 1983, 1993, 1998 .. 0 / 6 1.5 -0.9
 * Some of the Elections are in a Presidential System
 + Some of the Elections are in a Majoritarian System
 1 The figure on the left hand side is the number of elections where the leader was reelected. The figure on the right hand side is the total number of elections.
 2 Average for all the years included in the sample.
 
3 BALCH_ey -The average change in the government deficit ratio to GDP in the election year, compared to the previous year.Observations Reelected Not Reelected
Narrow Sample
Less Developed Countries 91 41 50
Developed Countries 164 86 78
Old Democracies 194 95 99
New Democracies 61 32 29
Total 255 127 128
Expanded Sample
Less Developed Countries 167 60 107
Developed Countries 180 88 92
Old Democracies 242 107 135
New Democracies 105 41 64
Total 347 148 199
Table 1: The Distribution of Election Campaigns According to Economic 
Development and the Age of Democracy 
1
1 For a definition of the country categories see Appendix I. For a list of the countries in each 
category see Table A-2.Table 2: The Effects of Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection in Developed and Less Developed Economies 
1
Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Countries Developed Less Developed All Countries Developed Less Developed
BALCH_term 
2 8.693** 11.339** 8.363 6.477** 7.172 8.251*
[0.033] [0.026] [0.268] [0.040] [0.108] [0.082]
BALCH_ey 
2 7.649* 22.073*** -4.248 6.097 19.390*** -0.521
[0.095] [0.001] [0.525] [0.118] [0.003] [0.921]
GDPPC_gr 
2 10.869*** -3.077 22.856*** 13.477*** -0.092 20.984***
[0.010] [0.615] [0.001] [0.000] [0.988] [0.000]
Developed Countries 0.510** 0.000 0.000 0.437** 0.000 0.000
[0.019] 0.000 0.000 [0.011] 0.000 0.000
New Democracies 0.467** 0.000 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.000
[0.045] 0.000 0.000 [0.197] 0.000 0.000
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.508*** 0.360 0.494* 0.471*** 0.305 0.463**
[0.008] [0.170] [0.083] [0.004] [0.197] [0.040]
Constant -0.845*** 0.108 -0.974*** -0.920*** -0.068 -0.999***
[0.001] [0.597] [0.001] [0.000] [0.730] [0.000]
Pseudo R
2 0.068 0.072 0.125 0.076 0.057 0.117
Akaike's criteria 343.34 220.59 119.65 451.48 245.28 202.63
Schwartz's criteria 368.13 236.09 132.20 478.43 261.25 218.22
Observations 255 164 91 347 180 167
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Dependent variable: REELECT
2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years.  BALCH_ey -The 
change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year.  GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the 
leader's current term.Table 3: Additional Effects of Election Year Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection 
1
Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BALCH_term * devloped 
2 11.847** 11.990** 12.352** 0.000 7.384* 0.000
[0.020] [0.020] [0.016] 0.000 [0.099] 0.000
BALCH_term * less_developed 
2 10.796 9.603 7.441 0.000 8.326* 0.000
[0.150] [0.210] [0.340] 0.000 [0.076] 0.000
BALCH_ey * developed 
2 23.488*** 23.360*** 20.881*** 19.556*** 19.990*** 17.257***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.007] [0.004] [0.002] [0.007]
BALCH_ey * less_developed 
2 -3.991 -3.276 -2.639 -6.875 -0.719 -3.395
[0.554] [0.642] [0.721] [0.311] [0.890] [0.505]
GDPPC_gr * developed 
2 -3.091 -3.639 -5.261 -4.766 0.152 -1.351
[0.615] [0.648] [0.421] [0.448] [0.979] [0.822]
GDPPC_gr * less_developed 
2 23.245*** 36.461*** 32.001*** 21.742*** 21.449*** 20.039***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
GDPPC_gr_ey * developed 
3 0.000 0.751 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 [0.906] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
GDPPC_gr_ey * less_developed 
3 0.000 -13.302** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 [0.015] 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
GDPD_trend_ey * developed 
4 0.000 0.000 6.626 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 [0.336] 0.000 0.000 0.000
GDPD_trend_ey * less_developed 
4 0.000 0.000 -17.224*** 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 [0.003] 0.000 0.000 0.000
BALCH_term+ey * developed 
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 13.851*** 0.000 10.089**
0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.003] 0.000 [0.016]
BALCH_term+ey * less_developed 
5 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.958 0.000 6.217
0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.288] 0.000 [0.170]
Developed Countries 1.338*** 1.373*** 1.651*** 1.345*** 1.047*** 1.076***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
New Democracies 0.537** 0.605** 0.682*** 0.532** 0.286 0.296
[0.026] [0.015] [0.009] [0.028] [0.135] [0.122]
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.473** 0.502** 0.459** 0.490** 0.412** 0.424**
[0.016] [0.012] [0.023] [0.012] [0.012] [0.010]
Constant -1.282*** -1.333*** -1.569*** -1.236*** -1.159*** -1.146***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R
2 0.108 0.127 0.143 0.116 0.101 0.105
Akaike's criteria 335.32 332.65 324.41 332.46 445.89 444.03
Schwartz's criteria 370.74 375.14 366.81 367.88 484.38 482.52
Observations 255 255 253 255 347 347
3 GDPPC_gr_ey - Per-capita GDP growth in the last year of the leader's term.
5 BALCH_term+ey - The change in the budget balance ratio to GDP during the leader's term, including elections year.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Dependent variable: REELECT
4 GDPD_trend_ey - The change in the deviation of real GDP from its trend, estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, in the last year of the 
leader's term.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An 
asterisk (*) indicates multiplication by the binary variable that follows. developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for developed countries, 
less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for less developed countries.
2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two 
previous years. BALCH_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - 
The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the leader's current term.Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BALCH_term * developed 
2 11.664** 12.200** 11.842** 7.237 7.530* 7.397*
[0.022] [0.018] [0.020] [0.105] [0.093] [0.098]
BALCH_term * less_developed 
2 10.964 10.252 10.762 8.953* 8.253* 8.306*
[0.144] [0.177] [0.152] [0.061] [0.078] [0.077]
BALCH_ey * developed 
2 23.614*** 24.696*** 23.520*** 20.262*** 20.430*** 19.806***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
BALCH_ey * less_developed 
2 -2.837 -4.792 -4.006 0.822 -0.764 -0.511
[0.679] [0.481] [0.553] [0.877] [0.883] [0.922]
GDPPC_gr * developed 
2 -3.335 -3.607 -3.082 -0.190 -0.052 0.108
[0.588] [0.558] [0.616] [0.974] [0.993] [0.985]
GDPPC_gr * less_developed 
2 22.891*** 23.753*** 23.250*** 20.595*** 21.653*** 21.393***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Parliamentary System 
3 0.256 0.000 0.000 0.355* 0.000 0.000
[0.303] 0.000 0.000 [0.065] 0.000 0.000
Predetermined Elections 
3 0.000 -0.211 0.000 0.000 -0.088 0.000
0.000 [0.225] 0.000 0.000 [0.566] 0.000
High Level of Democracy 
3 0.000 0.000 -0.019 0.000 0.000 0.108
0.000 0.000 [0.939] 0.000 0.000 [0.611]
Developed Countries 1.264*** 1.362*** 1.347*** 0.870*** 1.047*** 0.985***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.001]
New Democracies 0.578** 0.548** 0.533** 0.333* 0.289 0.311
[0.019] [0.024] [0.033] [0.086] [0.131] [0.115]
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.456** 0.464** 0.473** 0.363** 0.407** 0.413**
[0.021] [0.018] [0.016] [0.030] [0.014] [0.012]
Constant -1.441*** -1.164*** -1.273*** -1.294*** -1.101*** -1.198***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R
2 0.111 0.112 0.108 0.108 0.101 0.101
Akaike's criteria 336.26 335.84 337.32 444.46 447.56 447.63
Schwartz's criteria 375.21 374.80 376.27 486.80 489.90 489.97
Observations 255 255 255 347 347 347
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 4: Additional Effects of the Political System, the Timing of the Elections and the Level of Democracy on the 




3 Binary variables indicating whether the country has a parliamentary political system, whether the elections took place in their predetermined 
date and whether the country was classified as having a high level of democracy in the year of the election campaign, respectively.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An 
asterisk (*) indicates multiplication by the binary variable that follows. developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for developed countries, 
less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for less developed countries.
2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two 
previous years. BALCH_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year. 




Developed Countries 4.68 9.18 ..
Less Developed Countries .. .. 9.24
Old Democracies 4.27 4.13 ..
New Democracies .. .. 8.69
Old & Developed Democracies 4.72 7.71 ..
Old & Less Developed Democracies .. .. 6.14
Expanded Sample
Developed Countries 2.95 7.94 ..
Less Developed Countries 3.09 .. 8.13
Old Democracies 2.92 4.01 4.04
New Democracies .. .. 7.05
Old & Developed Democracies 3.16 7.05 ..
Old & Less Developed Democracies .. .. 7.37
 ".." - For coefficients with a significant level of more than 10 percent.
Table 5: Elasticities for Different Groups of Countries 
1
1 The elasticity is the change (in percentage points) in the probability for reelection for an increase of 1 percentage point in the variable
country categories see Appendix I. For a list of the countries in each category see Table A-2.
 2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the 
BALCH_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year.  GDPPC_gr - The a
real per-capita GDP during the leader's current term.Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BALCH_term * old 
2 10.709** 10.808** 0.000 7.392** 7.562** 0.000
[0.018] [0.019] 0.000 [0.042] [0.040] 0.000
BALCH_term * new_democracy 
2 0.559 1.085 0.000 4.941 6.665 0.000
[0.956] [0.916] 0.000 [0.431] [0.307] 0.000
BALCH_ey * old 
2 10.373* 10.491* 6.789 10.135** 9.784* 7.469
[0.078] [0.095] [0.237] [0.047] [0.068] [0.137]
BALCH_ey * new_democracy 
2 6.702 6.171 5.909 1.866 2.623 0.733
[0.361] [0.412] [0.464] [0.761] [0.677] [0.908]
GDPPC_gr * old 
2 6.330 4.969 5.069 10.204** 7.993 9.313**
[0.170] [0.487] [0.278] [0.011] [0.196] [0.020]
GDPPC_gr * new_democracy 
2 22.064*** 28.463*** 21.514*** 18.088*** 24.483*** 17.622***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
GDPPC_gr_ey * old 
3 0.000 0.728 0.000 0.000 1.731 0.000
0.000 [0.898] 0.000 0.000 [0.727] 0.000
GDPPC_gr_ey * new_democracy 
3 0.000 -8.168 0.000 0.000 -7.660* 0.000
0.000 [0.121] 0.000 0.000 [0.078] 0.000
BALCH_term+ey * old 
4 0.000 0.000 11.746*** 0.000 0.000 9.233***
0.000 0.000 [0.005] 0.000 0.000 [0.009]
BALCH_term+ey * new_democracy 
4 0.000 0.000 2.638 0.000 0.000 2.968
0.000 0.000 [0.759] 0.000 0.000 [0.614]
Developed Countries 0.468** 0.450** 0.483** 0.413*** 0.401** 0.432***
[0.020] [0.027] [0.017] [0.009] [0.011] [0.006]
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.489** 0.487** 0.499*** 0.465*** 0.449*** 0.473***
[0.011] [0.012] [0.009] [0.004] [0.006] [0.004]
Constant -0.674*** -0.635*** -0.653*** -0.808*** -0.777*** -0.803***
[0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R
2 0.075 0.082 0.083 0.080 0.087 0.085
Akaike's criteria 344.97 346.39 342.28 453.57 454.20 451.17
Schwartz's criteria 376.84 385.34 374.15 488.21 496.54 485.81
Observations 255 255 255 347 347 347
 
3 GDPPC_gr_ey - Per-capita GDP growth in the last year of the leader's term.
 
4 BALCH_term+ey - The change in the budget balance ratio to GDP during the leader's term, including the elections year.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Dependent variable: REELECT
Table 6: The Effects of Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection in New and Old Democracies
1
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An 
asterisk (*) indicates multiplication by the binary variable that follows. new_democracy - A binary variable with a value of 1 for new democracies, 
old - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old democracies.
2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous 
years. BALCH_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - The 
average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the leader's current term.Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BALCH_term * old_developed 
2 11.901** 12.203** 7.920* 8.252*
[0.021] [0.019] [0.081] [0.071]
BALCH_term * old_less_developed 
2 7.465 5.335 9.934 9.144
[0.475] [0.620] [0.148] [0.185]
BALCH_term * new_democracy 
2 1.412 1.107 5.271 7.029
[0.891] [0.916] [0.415] [0.313]
BALCH_ey * old_developed 
2 19.541*** 16.557** 17.715*** 15.535**
[0.007] [0.049] [0.008] [0.041]
BALCH_ey * old_less_developed 
2 -6.703 -9.020 3.634 3.469
[0.560] [0.488] [0.666] [0.698]
BALCH_ey * new_democracy 
2 6.327 7.323 1.914 4.116
[0.389] [0.341] [0.756] [0.525]
GDPPC_gr * old_developed 
2 -1.128 -3.373 0.818 -1.146
[0.850] [0.601] [0.887] [0.852]
GDPPC_gr * old_less_developed 
2 15.438** 14.500* 19.265*** 19.006***
[0.034] [0.078] [0.001] [0.004]
GDPPC_gr * new_democracy 
2 25.385*** 27.705*** 20.657*** 23.419***
[0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
GDPD_trend_ey * old_developed 
3 0.000 5.587 0.000 4.528
0.000 [0.454] 0.000 [0.512]
GDPD_trend_ey * old_less_developed 
3 0.000 0.085 0.000 1.364
0.000 [0.993] 0.000 [0.855]
GDPD_trend_ey * new_democracy 
3 0.000 -13.094** 0.000 -10.716**
0.000 [0.023] 0.000 [0.016]
Developed Countries 0.843*** 0.863*** 0.784*** 0.826***
[0.002] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000]
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.448** 0.420** 0.420** 0.361**
[0.022] [0.036] [0.011] [0.032]
Constant -0.857*** -0.827*** -0.941*** -0.932***
[0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R
2 0.093 0.112 0.093 0.112
Akaike's criteria 344.59 341.57 453.13 449.834
Schwartz's criteria 387.09 394.57 499.32 507.487
Observations 255 253 347 345
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 7: The Effects of Budget Balances, Growth and Deviations of GDP from its trend on the Probability 
of Reelection in Developed, Less Developed and New Democracies
1
Dependent variable: REELECT
3 GDPD_trend_ey - The change in the difference between real GDP and its trend, estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, 
in the last year of the leader's term.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses 
are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication by the binary variable that follows.  new_democracy - A binary variable 
with a value of 1 for new democracies, old_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old and developed 
democracies, old_less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old and less developed democracies.
2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, 
relative to the two previous years. BALCH_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, 
compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the leader's current 
term.Less Developed Developed Old New Total
Narrow Sample
Observations 91 164 194 61 255
Developed .. .. 153 11 164
Less developed .. .. 41 50 91
New 50 11 .. .. 61
Old 41 153 .. .. 194
Parliamentry 57 154 175 36 211
Presidential 34 10 19 25 44
Proportional 48 133 140 41 181
Majoritarian 43 31 54 20 74
Predetermined 
Election
60 96 117 39 156
Early Election 31 68 77 22 99
High Level of 
Democracy
28 151 162 17 179
Low Level of 
Democracy
63 13 32 44 76
Expanded Sample
Observations 167 180 242 105 347
Developed .. .. 169 11 180
Less developed .. .. 73 94 167
New 94 11 .. .. 105
Old 73 169 .. .. 242
Parliamentry 68 167 195 40 235
Presidential 99 13 47 65 112
Proportional 116 142 178 80 258
Majoritarian 51 38 64 25 89
Predetermined 
Election
120 106 152 74 226
Early Election 47 74 90 31 121
High Level of 
Democracy
40 167 186 21 207
Low Level of 
Democracy
127 13 56 84 140
1 For definition of the various charactaristics see Appendix I. For a list of the country categories see table A-2.
Table 8: Characteristics of Election Campaigns in Developed Countries and New DemocraciesNarrow Sample 
2
Interaction Binary Variable: 
3 parl pres prop maj
BALCH_term * developed 
3 12.152** -3.824 13.606** 9.448
[0.019] [0.893] [0.018] [0.445]
BALCH_term * less_developed 
3 16.809* -6.118 -0.936 24.194**
[0.065] [0.683] [0.932] [0.036]
BALCH_ey * developed 
3 24.023*** 17.776 29.313*** 2.269
[0.001] [0.603] [0.000] [0.901]
BALCH_ey * less_developed 
3 -2.939 -3.891 -10.543 7.067
[0.691] [0.819] [0.282] [0.503]
GDPPC_gr * developed 
3 -2.391 -25.574 -2.270 -19.795
[0.700] [0.180] [0.719] [0.267]
GDPPC_gr * less_developed 
3 24.157*** 23.464** 24.836** 20.962**
[0.001] [0.025] [0.016] [0.019]
Developed Countries 
4
New Democracies  
4








 2 There is no qualitative difference in the results when the equations are estimated for the expanded sample.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 9: Varying Effects of Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection in Different 






















5 The binary variables on the left column have no interaction with other variables.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses 
are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication by the binary variable that follows. developed - A binary variable with 
a value of 1 for developed countries, less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for less developed countries.








3 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, 
relative to the two previous years. BALCH_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, 
compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the leader's current 
term.Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
Interaction Binary Variable: 
2 high low pred early high low pred early
BALCH_term * developed 
3 12.466** -40.680 14.203* 12.691* 7.870* -46.060 7.235 10.140
[0.016] [0.391] [0.054] [0.087] [0.081] [0.321] [0.259] [0.123]
BALCH_term * less_developed 
3 4.445 15.370* 3.488 27.097 12.015 7.856 2.522 23.812*
[0.770] [0.092] [0.699] [0.147] [0.338] [0.118] [0.671] [0.061]
BALCH_ey * developed 
3 22.573*** 27.104 16.480* 36.779*** 19.689*** 17.725 13.872* 33.155***
[0.002] [0.249] [0.065] [0.001] [0.003] [0.441] [0.097] [0.002]
BALCH_ey * less_developed 
3 12.256 -12.841 -2.578 -7.402 9.560 -3.941 -1.297 3.777
[0.358] [0.136] [0.733] [0.676] [0.387] [0.512] [0.825] [0.766]
GDPPC_gr * developed 
3 -1.549 -12.077 -6.531 2.142 1.393 -4.578 -3.116 5.434
[0.806] [0.412] [0.356] [0.768] [0.818] [0.746] [0.645] [0.437]
GDPPC_gr * less_developed 
3 22.178** 27.569*** 22.463*** 27.842*** 22.476*** 21.444*** 20.582*** 24.223***













* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
3 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years. BALCH_ey -The 
change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the 
leader's current term.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication 





2 The coefficients in each column are for the interaction of the variable on the top of column with the variable on the left column.
Table 10: Varying Effects of Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection According to theTiming of the Elections and the Level of 
Democracy: Developed and Less Developed Economies 
1












































Interaction Binary Variable: 
2 parl pres prop maj
BALCH_term * old 
3 10.975** -10.278 10.021* 12.524
[0.019] [0.639] [0.064] [0.136]
BALCH_term * new_democracy 
3 4.425 -7.270 -2.662 7.634
[0.738] [0.663] [0.818] [0.737]
BALCH_ey * old 
3 10.051* 20.932 18.582** -5.289
[0.098] [0.396] [0.013] [0.607]
BALCH_ey * new_democracy 
3 10.138 -13.683 0.484 22.160
[0.205] [0.511] [0.956] [0.171]
GDPPC_gr * old 
3 7.129 -9.577 4.474 10.158
[0.130] [0.445] [0.429] [0.215]
GDPPC_gr * new_democracy 
3 19.948** 20.253* 17.161** 42.480**
[0.017] [0.071] [0.030] [0.017]
Developed Countries 
4















Table 11: Varying Effects of Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection 


















2 The coefficients in each column are for the interaction of the variable on the top of column with the variable 
on the left column.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent 
level.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in 
the parantheses are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication by the binary variable that follows. 
new_democracy - A binary variable with a value of 1 for new democracies, old - A binary variable with a 
value of 1 for old democracies.
4 The binary variables on the left column have no interaction with other variables.
3 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the 
election year, relative to the two previous years. BALCH_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio to 
GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-
capita GDP during the leader's current term.Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
Interaction Binary Variable: 
2 high low pred early high low pred early
BALCH_term * old 
3 10.308** 6.448 9.176 13.998** 7.151 7.072 2.782 13.831**
[0.037] [0.589] [0.139] [0.044] [0.101] [0.318] [0.577] [0.021]
BALCH_term * new_democracy 
3 -2.495 7.734 1.831 11.508 10.578 5.205 4.973 7.408
[0.915] [0.529] [0.877] [0.629] [0.509] [0.452] [0.522] [0.603]
BALCH_ey * old 
3 16.393** -13.652 5.429 19.912** 14.271** 1.464 6.934 17.332**
[0.016] [0.312] [0.457] [0.044] [0.020] [0.877] [0.274] [0.047]
BALCH_ey * new_democracy 
3 26.543 -2.786 3.507 25.063 20.476 -3.531 -2.725 20.658
[0.111] [0.763] [0.680] [0.214] [0.159] [0.627] [0.696] [0.184]
GDPPC_gr * old 
3 6.397 6.627 3.700 9.290 8.514* 12.686** 8.708** 12.124**
[0.213] [0.413] [0.471] [0.122] [0.075] [0.041] [0.048] [0.029]
GDPPC_gr * new_democracy 
3 23.931* 24.962*** 22.100*** 20.596* 24.756** 17.576*** 15.930*** 22.229**
[0.070] [0.002] [0.009] [0.060] [0.019] [0.003] [0.008] [0.022]
Developed Countries 
4








* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication 
by the binary variable that follows. new_democracy - A binary variable with a value of 1 for new democracies, old - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old democracies.
3 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years.  BALCH_ey -The 
change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year.  GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the 
leader's current term.
0.471***
Table 12: Varying Effects of Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection According to theTiming of the Elections and the Level of 
Democracy: Old and New Democracies 
1





























2 The coefficients in each column are for the interaction of the variable on the top of column with the variable on the left column.









Interaction Binary Variable: 
2 parl pres prop maj
BALCH_term * old_developed 
3 11.522** 26.626 13.825** 8.346
[0.028] [0.479] [0.019] [0.488]
BALCH_term * old_less_developed 
3 9.057 -25.632 -16.044 20.069
[0.442] [0.424] [0.456] [0.151]
BALCH_term * new_democracy 
3 3.694 -4.801 -1.995 8.019
[0.784] [0.779] [0.867] [0.724]
BALCH_ey * old_developed 
3 18.424** 90.815 25.693*** -2.152
[0.012] [0.163] [0.002] [0.902]
BALCH_ey * old_less_developed 
3 -6.746 7.854 -16.571 -0.565
[0.605] [0.768] [0.422] [0.969]
BALCH_ey * new_democracy 
3 8.897 -12.319 -0.082 21.362
[0.265] [0.566] [0.993] [0.188]
GDPPC_gr * old_developed 
3 -0.191 -38.708 -0.973 -6.382
[0.975] [0.166] [0.875] [0.706]
GDPPC_gr * old_less_developed 
3 15.906** 5.846 18.589 13.551
[0.040] [0.716] [0.144] [0.131]
GDPPC_gr * new_democracy 
3 23.114*** 25.858** 21.162** 44.924**
[0.008] [0.030] [0.015] [0.016]
Developed Countries 
4








* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-
values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication by the binary variable that follows. new_democracy - A binary variable with a 
value of 1 for new democracies, old_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old and developed democracies, 
old_less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old and less developed democracies.
3 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to
the two previous years. BALCH_ey -The change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the 









Table 13: Varying Effects of Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection in Different 








2 The coefficients in each column are for the interaction of the variable on the top of column with the variable on the left column.







0.114Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
Interaction Binary Variable: 
2 high low pred early high low pred early
BALCH_term * old_developed 
3 12.280** -147.115 14.738** 11.404 8.138* -138.309 8.154 9.579
[0.018] [0.342] [0.048] [0.124] [0.074] [0.380] [0.208] [0.147]
BALCH_term * old_less_dev 
3 6.105 4.034 -7.216 42.565 11.503 8.832 -1.685 43.530*
[0.762] [0.754] [0.609] [0.159] [0.519] [0.233] [0.865] [0.085]
BALCH_term * new_democracy 
3 -1.863 8.665 4.262 14.060 10.860 5.519 5.763 8.396
[0.939] [0.488] [0.723] [0.578] [0.509] [0.438] [0.464] [0.604]
BALCH_ey * old_developed 
3 19.150*** 17.127 15.909* 29.628** 17.475** 12.856 14.183* 27.932**
[0.010] [0.644] [0.084] [0.012] [0.011] [0.731] [0.099] [0.012]
BALCH_ey * old_less_dev 
3 13.701 -26.348 -16.216 10.386 11.831 -0.216 0.979 18.980
[0.467] [0.134] [0.299] [0.626] [0.440] [0.983] [0.925] [0.325]
BALCH_ey * new_democracy 
3 27.075 -3.142 1.877 28.942 20.381 -3.496 -3.170 22.952
[0.107] [0.734] [0.826] [0.155] [0.159] [0.633] [0.653] [0.147]
GDPPC_gr * old_developed 
3 -0.972 -21.115 -5.561 3.861 0.886 -17.010 -2.900 6.009
[0.874] [0.317] [0.416] [0.601] [0.880] [0.415] [0.658] [0.400]
GDPPC_gr * old_less_dev 
3 17.733* 13.402 13.211 17.040 20.764** 18.232*** 18.534*** 16.846
[0.095] [0.152] [0.140] [0.138] [0.024] [0.008] [0.007] [0.108]
GDPPC_gr * new_democracy 
3 26.342* 27.434*** 27.443*** 23.114** 26.344** 19.689*** 19.489*** 23.702**
[0.064] [0.001] [0.002] [0.045] [0.017] [0.001] [0.002] [0.018]
Developed Countries 
4








* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
3 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years. BALCH_ey -The 
change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the 
leader's current term.
2 The coefficients in each column are for the interaction of the variable on the top of column with the variable on the left column.
4 The binary variables on the left column have no interaction with other variables.
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication 
by the binary variable that follows. new_democracy - A binary variable with a value of 1 for new democracies, old_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old and 
developed democracies, old_less_dev - A binary variable with a value of 1 for old and less developed democracies.
Table 14: Varying Effects of Budget Balances and Growth on the Probability of Reelection According to theTiming of the Elections and the Level of 
Democracy: Developed, Less Developed and New Democracies 
1




































351.69 354.03Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BALCH_term * developed 
2 12.132** 11.262** 11.267** 11.440** 7.574* 6.611 6.640 6.856
[0.018] [0.029] [0.029] [0.027] [0.091] [0.140] [0.139] [0.128]
BALCH_term * less_developed 
2 11.381 6.872 7.141 5.601 8.953* 8.193* 8.484* 7.913
[0.139] [0.391] [0.372] [0.493] [0.066] [0.099] [0.089] [0.111]
BALCH_ey * developed 
2 24.484*** 25.281*** 25.259*** 24.542*** 20.842*** 21.200*** 21.143*** 21.051***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
BALCH_ey * less_developed 
2 -1.860 -0.613 -0.411 0.530 1.122 2.792 3.455 3.403
[0.820] [0.944] [0.962] [0.952] [0.850] [0.654] [0.583] [0.587]
GDPPC_gr * developed 
2 -3.518 -3.455 -3.435 -1.683 -0.236 0.596 0.593 1.985
[0.564] [0.580] [0.582] [0.790] [0.968] [0.921] [0.921] [0.743]
GDPPC_gr * less_developed 
2 18.716** 21.036*** 21.121*** 22.715*** 19.370*** 19.525*** 19.559*** 20.222***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.005] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000]
PARTY 
3 0.000 2.062*** 2.062*** 0.000 0.000 1.887*** 1.823*** 0.000
0.000 [0.001] [0.001] 0.000 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] 0.000
PARTY * majoritarian 
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.337*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.091***
0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.000] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.000]
PARTY * proportional 
3 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.265* 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.344**
0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.087] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.019]
VOTES 
4 0.000 1.583** 0.000 1.362* 0.000 1.477*** 0.000 1.368***
0.000 [0.035] 0.000 [0.073] 0.000 [0.004] 0.000 [0.008]
VOTES_R2 
5 0.000 0.000 1.621** 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.476*** 0.000
0.000 0.000 [0.039] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.005] 0.000
D_R2 
6 0.000 0.000 -0.341 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.562 0.000
0.000 0.000 [0.521] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.140] 0.000
Developed Countries 1.045*** 1.150*** 1.148*** 1.349*** 0.920*** 0.863*** 0.835*** 0.976***
[0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.001] [0.001] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001]
New Democracies 0.291 0.393 0.391 0.453* 0.099 0.198 0.193 0.227
[0.251] [0.147] [0.150] [0.099] [0.618] [0.346] [0.358] [0.282]
Constant -0.873*** -1.835*** -1.834*** -1.840*** -0.926*** -1.678*** -1.625*** -1.670***
[0.003] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R
2 0.083 0.119 0.119 0.132 0.083 0.119 0.119 0.132
Akaike's criteria 320.55 312.49 314.68 310.24 428.15 414.15 415.86 413.46
Schwartz's criteria 351.81 350.68 356.35 351.91 462.34 455.94 461.45 459.05
Observations 238 238 238 238 330 330 330 330
3 PARTY - The percent of seats in the parliament held by the leader's party, receives the value 0 in a presidential system.
4 VOTES - The percent of the votes received by a leader in a presidential system in the first round of the previous elections.
5 VOTES_R2 - The percent of the votes received by a leader in a presidential system in the last round of the previous elections.
6 D_R2 - A binary variable receiving the value 1 for a leader in a presidential system, that had to run in more then one round in the previous elections.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 15: Additional Effects of the Political Strength of the Leader on the Probability of Reelection 
1
Dependent variable: REELECT
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication 
by the binary variable that follows.  developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for developed countries,  less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for less 
developed countries.
2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years.  BALCH_ey -The 
change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year.  GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the 
leader's current term.Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BALCH_term * developed 
2 12.026** 9.889* 12.070** 11.666** 7.529* 5.883 7.260 6.991
[0.021] [0.065] [0.021] [0.028] [0.098] [0.207] [0.112] [0.129]
BALCH_term * less_developed 
2 11.166 5.482 5.791 5.779 9.147* 8.071 8.317 8.543*
[0.142] [0.501] [0.476] [0.479] [0.060] [0.106] [0.104] [0.096]
BALCH_ey * developed 
2 20.575*** 17.131** 24.374*** 21.562*** 17.714*** 15.097** 20.594*** 18.424***
[0.004] [0.027] [0.001] [0.004] [0.008] [0.034] [0.002] [0.007]
BALCH_ey * less_developed 
2 -3.606 1.660 0.825 1.456 -0.590 4.171 3.717 3.830
[0.598] [0.853] [0.926] [0.870] [0.911] [0.512] [0.556] [0.546]
GDPPC_gr * developed 
2 0.714 3.292 3.119 2.790 4.462 7.136 7.230 6.873
[0.916] [0.634] [0.651] [0.688] [0.489] [0.278] [0.272] [0.298]
GDPPC_gr * less_developed 
2 22.999*** 23.973*** 21.754*** 22.536*** 21.125*** 19.563*** 19.774*** 19.485***
[0.001] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
INF_ey * Developed 
3 0.000 -7.085*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.889** 0.000 0.000
0.000 [0.005] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.012] 0.000 0.000
INF_ey * Less_Developed 
3 0.000 0.844 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.188 0.000 0.000
0.000 [0.547] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.835] 0.000 0.000
INFCH_ey * Developed 
4 -7.804* -6.221 -6.831* -9.606** -8.148** -7.027* -7.546** -9.949**
[0.059] [0.129] [0.067] [0.031] [0.043] [0.075] [0.040] [0.021]
INFCH_ey * Less_Developed 
4 3.471 0.000 1.880 2.177 0.587 0.000 0.193 0.352
[0.231] 0.000 [0.519] [0.462] [0.542] 0.000 [0.832] [0.713]
Average_INF * Developed 
5 -2.100* 0.000 0.000 -2.406** -1.566 0.000 0.000 -1.950*
[0.068] 0.000 0.000 [0.045] [0.159] 0.000 0.000 [0.090]
Average_INF * Less_Developed 
5 -0.301 0.000 0.000 0.213 -0.582 0.000 0.000 -0.355
[0.678] 0.000 0.000 [0.783] [0.316] 0.000 0.000 [0.560]
PARTY 
6 0.000 2.146*** 1.803*** 1.998*** 0.000 1.855*** 1.716*** 1.795***
0.000 [0.002] [0.006] [0.003] 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VOTES 
7 0.000 1.609** 1.414* 1.453* 0.000 1.490*** 1.414*** 1.465***
0.000 [0.039] [0.064] [0.059] 0.000 [0.004] [0.007] [0.005]
Developed Countries 1.364*** 1.757*** 1.048*** 1.353*** 0.969*** 1.092*** 0.716** 0.836**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.020] [0.014]
New Democracies 0.725*** 0.648** 0.444 0.627** 0.369* 0.315 0.199 0.310
[0.006] [0.028] [0.113] [0.039] [0.065] [0.153] [0.351] [0.166]
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.499** 0.485** 0.420* 0.435* 0.413** 0.317* 0.314* 0.291
[0.015] [0.032] [0.056] [0.053] [0.016] [0.095] [0.091] [0.125]
Constant -1.279*** -2.340*** -1.895*** -2.111*** -1.096*** -1.798*** -1.716*** -1.725***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R
2 0.132 0.167 0.142 0.156 0.116 0.157 0.142 0.149
Akaike's criteria 334.90 304.94 310.95 310.55 446.54 408.26 412.85 413.54
Schwartz's criteria 384.48 357.02 359.57 366.11 500.43 465.25 466.04 474.33
Observations 255 238 238 238 347 330 330 330
3 INF_ey - The inflation rate in the election year.
4 INFCH_ey - The increase in the inflation rate from the year preceding the election year to the election year.
5 Average_INF - The average rate of inflation rate during the leader's current term.
6 PARTY - The percent of seats in the parliament held by the leader's party, receives the value 0 in a presidential system.
7 VOTES - The percent of the votes received by a leader in a presidential system in the first round of the previous elections.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 16: Additional Effects of the Inflation Rate on the Probability of Reelection 
1
Dependent variable: REELECT
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication 
by the binary variable that follows.  developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for developed countries,  less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for less 
developed countries.
2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years.  BALCH_ey -The 
change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year.  GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the 
leader's current term.Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BALCH_term * developed 
2 11.913** 9.670* 11.812** 11.478** 7.432 5.766 7.110 6.876
[0.023] [0.073] [0.025] [0.031] [0.103] [0.217] [0.121] [0.137]
BALCH_term * less_developed 
2 10.848 5.119 5.465 5.752 8.726* 8.458* 8.659* 8.689*
[0.151] [0.529] [0.502] [0.479] [0.072] [0.092] [0.092] [0.090]
BALCH_ey * developed 
2 20.280*** 16.535** 23.577*** 20.995*** 17.387*** 14.696** 19.981*** 17.998***
[0.005] [0.033] [0.001] [0.005] [0.009] [0.039] [0.003] [0.009]
BALCH_ey * less_developed 
2 -2.731 0.977 0.203 0.645 -0.803 3.762 3.341 3.409
[0.701] [0.914] [0.982] [0.943] [0.881] [0.556] [0.599] [0.592]
GLOBAL_gr * Developed 
3 6.604 15.470 16.369 13.760 13.148 18.983 20.890 18.744
[0.703] [0.391] [0.356] [0.442] [0.441] [0.281] [0.230] [0.285]
GLOBAL_gr * Less_Developed 
3 29.389 -31.595 -26.583 -25.313 0.143 -18.249 -17.147 -17.299
[0.654] [0.684] [0.733] [0.746] [0.995] [0.476] [0.501] [0.498]
DOMESTIC_gr * developed 
3 0.059 2.084 1.700 1.544 3.771 6.059 5.900 5.889
[0.993] [0.772] [0.813] [0.831] [0.573] [0.374] [0.388] [0.390]
DOMESTIC_gr * less_developed 
3 23.008*** 24.662*** 22.314*** 22.899*** 21.909*** 20.525*** 20.699*** 20.929***
[0.001] [0.003] [0.006] [0.005] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000]
INF_ey * Developed 
4 0.000 -7.043*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -5.830** 0.000 0.000
0.000 [0.006] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.013] 0.000 0.000
INF_ey * Less_Developed 
4 0.000 0.883 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.211 0.000 0.000
0.000 [0.530] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.816] 0.000 0.000
INFCH_ey * Developed 
5 -7.702* -6.305 -6.808* -9.517** -8.119** -7.117* -7.554** -10.003**
[0.062] [0.124] [0.068] [0.032] [0.043] [0.071] [0.040] [0.021]
INFCH_ey * Less_Developed 
5 3.654 0.000 1.853 2.039 0.396 0.000 0.179 0.197
[0.204] 0.000 [0.529] [0.491] [0.662] 0.000 [0.845] [0.829]
Average_INF * Developed 
6 -2.049* 0.000 0.000 -2.368** -1.492 0.000 0.000 -1.884
[0.075] 0.000 0.000 [0.049] [0.181] 0.000 0.000 [0.104]
PARTY 
7 0.000 2.242*** 1.895*** 2.049*** 0.000 1.890*** 1.756*** 1.843***
0.000 [0.001] [0.004] [0.003] 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VOTES 
8 0.000 1.699** 1.509* 1.534* 0.000 1.497*** 1.431*** 1.448***
0.000 [0.034] [0.053] [0.051] 0.000 [0.005] [0.007] [0.006]
Developed Countries 1.906 0.772 0.146 0.499 0.859 0.430 0.040 0.259
[0.226] [0.676] [0.937] [0.787] [0.197] [0.575] [0.955] [0.725]
New Democracies 0.715*** 0.660** 0.457 0.645** 0.349* 0.323 0.210 0.299
[0.006] [0.026] [0.104] [0.031] [0.079] [0.143] [0.327] [0.178]
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.509** 0.528** 0.459** 0.460** 0.460*** 0.362* 0.361* 0.352*
[0.014] [0.025] [0.044] [0.046] [0.008] [0.064] [0.060] [0.068]
Constant -1.978 -1.724 -1.382 -1.571 -1.222*** -1.467** -1.415** -1.486**
[0.183] [0.331] [0.431] [0.374] [0.009] [0.018] [0.015] [0.011]
Pseudo R
2 0.132 0.169 0.144 0.157 0.115 0.159 0.145 0.151
Akaike's criteria 336.73 308.27 314.21 312.10 449.28 411.26 415.71 414.93
Schwartz's criteria 389.85 367.30 369.76 371.12 507.02 475.84 476.50 479.51
Observations 255 238 238 238 347 330 330 330
4 INF_ey - The inflation rate in the election year.
5 INFCH_ey - The increase in the inflation rate from the year preceding the election year to the election year.
6 Average_INF - The average rate of inflation rate during the leader's current term.
7 PARTY - The percent of seats in the parliament held by the leader's party, receives the value 0 in a presidential system.
8 VOTES - The percent of the votes received by a leader in a presidential system in the first round of the previous elections.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
3 GLOBAL_gr - The predicted growth rate of the country during the leeader's term in office based on a regression of the growth rates on the product of global growth and the 
share of exports in the country's GDP. DOMESTIC_gr - The difference between GDPPC_gr and GLOBAL_gr.
Dependent variable: REELECT
Table 17: Separate Effects of Global and Domestic Induced Growth on the Probability of Reelection 
1
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication 
by the binary variable that follows.  developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for developed countries,  less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for less 
developed countries.
2 BALCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government deficit to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years.  BALCH_ey -The 
change in the government deficit ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year.Narrow Sample Expanded Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
REVCH_term * developed 
2 11.083** 8.894 11.084** 10.738* 6.483 4.726 6.182 5.903
[0.049] [0.127] [0.048] [0.060] [0.193] [0.357] [0.213] [0.240]
REVCH_term * less_developed 
2 11.325 6.919 6.076 6.453 12.815* 10.272 10.468 10.981
[0.235] [0.488] [0.542] [0.516] [0.069] [0.156] [0.153] [0.139]
EXPCH_term * developed 
2 -10.809** -8.613 -11.508** -10.966** -6.293 -4.574 -6.637 -6.188
[0.048] [0.128] [0.034] [0.047] [0.187] [0.352] [0.162] [0.198]
EXPCH_term * less_developed 
2 -9.865 -4.942 -5.239 -5.086 -8.883* -7.872 -8.199 -8.439
[0.211] [0.551] [0.529] [0.544] [0.074] [0.118] [0.113] [0.103]
REVCH_ey * developed 
2 33.346*** 30.668*** 33.762*** 32.869*** 29.863*** 28.176*** 29.596*** 29.076***
[0.002] [0.007] [0.002] [0.004] [0.003] [0.007] [0.004] [0.005]
REVCH_ey * less_developed 
2 5.445 6.538 5.925 7.016 2.976 5.891 5.489 5.775
[0.548] [0.533] [0.571] [0.507] [0.658] [0.437] [0.468] [0.448]
EXPCH_ey * developed 
2 -19.707*** -14.926* -24.200*** -20.865*** -16.570** -12.730* -20.110*** -17.433**
[0.008] [0.069] [0.001] [0.006] [0.016] [0.093] [0.004] [0.014]
EXPCH_ey * less_developed 
2 7.655 1.053 2.507 2.068 2.636 -2.993 -2.425 -2.438
[0.311] [0.913] [0.795] [0.832] [0.652] [0.673] [0.731] [0.731]
GDPPC_gr * developed 
2 -0.034 2.584 2.326 1.990 3.606 6.347 6.463 6.067
[0.996] [0.719] [0.742] [0.781] [0.587] [0.350] [0.337] [0.371]
GDPPC_gr * less_developed 
2 21.591*** 23.518*** 20.807** 21.662*** 21.197*** 19.625*** 19.869*** 19.577***
[0.003] [0.005] [0.011] [0.009] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
INF_ey * Developed 
3 0.000 -8.088*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -6.906*** 0.000 0.000
0.000 [0.002] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.005] 0.000 0.000
INF_ey * Less_Developed 
3 0.000 0.978 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.175 0.000 0.000
0.000 [0.490] 0.000 0.000 0.000 [0.846] 0.000 0.000
INFCH_ey * Developed 
4 -8.361** -6.384 -6.965* -10.179** -8.596** -7.166* -7.655** -10.464**
[0.045] [0.116] [0.062] [0.023] [0.034] [0.067] [0.036] [0.016]
INFCH_ey * Less_Developed 
4 4.445 0.000 2.587 2.969 0.706 0.000 0.261 0.437
[0.141] 0.000 [0.399] [0.342] [0.462] 0.000 [0.774] [0.649]
Average_INF * Developed 
5 -2.322** 0.000 0.000 -2.579** -1.790 0.000 0.000 -2.132*
[0.043] 0.000 0.000 [0.030] [0.106] 0.000 0.000 [0.063]
Average_INF * Less_Developed 
5 -0.216 0.000 0.000 0.250 -0.614 0.000 0.000 -0.377
[0.770] 0.000 0.000 [0.750] [0.293] 0.000 0.000 [0.537]
PARTY 
6 0.000 2.140*** 1.811*** 2.012*** 0.000 1.846*** 1.708*** 1.791***
0.000 [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] 0.000 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
VOTES 
7 0.000 1.557** 1.426* 1.451* 0.000 1.456*** 1.397*** 1.444***
0.000 [0.045] [0.061] [0.059] 0.000 [0.005] [0.007] [0.006]
Developed Countries 1.314*** 1.787*** 0.995** 1.317*** 0.994*** 1.156*** 0.727** 0.857**
[0.001] [0.000] [0.013] [0.003] [0.002] [0.003] [0.020] [0.013]
New Democracies 0.743*** 0.663** 0.442 0.641** 0.373* 0.323 0.194 0.316
[0.005] [0.025] [0.116] [0.036] [0.064] [0.144] [0.366] [0.160]
Majoritarian Electoral System 0.522** 0.479** 0.414* 0.429* 0.415** 0.310 0.310* 0.284
[0.013] [0.036] [0.062] [0.059] [0.017] [0.105] [0.099] [0.137]
Constant -1.216*** -2.311*** -1.833*** -2.060*** -1.100*** -1.797*** -1.710*** -1.720***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Pseudo R
2 0.147 0.178 0.149 0.164 0.125 0.164 0.146 0.154
Akaike's criteria 337.50 309.12 316.81 315.66 450.53 412.84 419.27 419.30
Schwartz's criteria 401.25 375.10 379.31 385.10 519.82 485.03 487.66 495.28
Observations 255 238 238 238 347 330 330 330
3 INF_ey - The inflation rate in the election year.
4 INFCH_ey - The increase in the inflation rate from the year preceding the election year to the election year.
5 Average_INF - The average rate of inflation rate during the leader's current term.
6 PARTY - The percent of seats in the parliament held by the leader's party, receives the value 0 in a presidential system.
7 VOTES - The percent of the votes received by a leader in a presidential system in the first round of the previous elections.
* - Significant at the 10 percent level; ** - Significant at the 5 percent level; *** - Significant at the 1 percent level.
Table 18: Separate Effects of Revenue and Expenditure on the Probability of Reelection 
1
Dependent variable: REELECT
1 For variables definitions see Appendix I. The figures in the table are probit coefficients and the figures in the parantheses are P-values. An asterisk (*) indicates multiplication 
by the binary variable that follows. developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for developed countries, less_developed - A binary variable with a value of 1 for less 
developed countries.
2 REVCH_term - The change in the ratio of the government revenue to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years.EXPCH_term - The 
change in the ratio of the government expenditure to GDP in the two years preceding the election year, relative to the two previous years.  REVCH_ey -The change in the 
government revenue ratio to GDP In the election year, compared to the previous year. EXPCH_ey -The change in the government expenditure ratio to GDP In the election 
year, compared to the previous year. GDPPC_gr - The average growth rate of real per-capita GDP during the leader's current term.